mirror of
https://codeberg.org/anoncontributorxmr/monero.git
synced 2024-11-22 23:42:24 +00:00
256 lines
8 KiB
C++
256 lines
8 KiB
C++
// Copyright (c) 2017-2018, The Monero Project
|
|
//
|
|
// All rights reserved.
|
|
//
|
|
// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are
|
|
// permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
|
|
//
|
|
// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of
|
|
// conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
|
//
|
|
// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list
|
|
// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
|
|
// materials provided with the distribution.
|
|
//
|
|
// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be
|
|
// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
|
|
// prior written permission.
|
|
//
|
|
// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
|
|
// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
|
|
// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
|
|
// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
|
|
// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
|
|
// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
|
|
// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
|
|
// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF
|
|
// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
|
//
|
|
// Parts of this file are originally copyright (c) 2012-2013 The Cryptonote developers
|
|
|
|
#include "gtest/gtest.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "string_tools.h"
|
|
#include "ringct/rctOps.h"
|
|
#include "ringct/rctSigs.h"
|
|
#include "ringct/bulletproofs.h"
|
|
#include "device/device.hpp"
|
|
#include "misc_log_ex.h"
|
|
|
|
TEST(bulletproofs, valid_zero)
|
|
{
|
|
rct::Bulletproof proof = bulletproof_PROVE(0, rct::skGen());
|
|
ASSERT_TRUE(rct::bulletproof_VERIFY(proof));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
TEST(bulletproofs, valid_max)
|
|
{
|
|
rct::Bulletproof proof = bulletproof_PROVE(0xffffffffffffffff, rct::skGen());
|
|
ASSERT_TRUE(rct::bulletproof_VERIFY(proof));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
TEST(bulletproofs, valid_random)
|
|
{
|
|
for (int n = 0; n < 8; ++n)
|
|
{
|
|
rct::Bulletproof proof = bulletproof_PROVE(crypto::rand<uint64_t>(), rct::skGen());
|
|
ASSERT_TRUE(rct::bulletproof_VERIFY(proof));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
TEST(bulletproofs, valid_multi_random)
|
|
{
|
|
for (int n = 0; n < 8; ++n)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t outputs = 2 + n;
|
|
std::vector<uint64_t> amounts;
|
|
rct::keyV gamma;
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < outputs; ++i)
|
|
{
|
|
amounts.push_back(crypto::rand<uint64_t>());
|
|
gamma.push_back(rct::skGen());
|
|
}
|
|
rct::Bulletproof proof = bulletproof_PROVE(amounts, gamma);
|
|
ASSERT_TRUE(rct::bulletproof_VERIFY(proof));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
TEST(bulletproofs, multi_splitting)
|
|
{
|
|
rct::ctkeyV sc, pc;
|
|
rct::ctkey sctmp, pctmp;
|
|
std::vector<unsigned int> index;
|
|
std::vector<uint64_t> inamounts, outamounts;
|
|
|
|
std::tie(sctmp, pctmp) = rct::ctskpkGen(6000);
|
|
sc.push_back(sctmp);
|
|
pc.push_back(pctmp);
|
|
inamounts.push_back(6000);
|
|
index.push_back(1);
|
|
|
|
std::tie(sctmp, pctmp) = rct::ctskpkGen(7000);
|
|
sc.push_back(sctmp);
|
|
pc.push_back(pctmp);
|
|
inamounts.push_back(7000);
|
|
index.push_back(1);
|
|
|
|
const int mixin = 3, max_outputs = 16;
|
|
|
|
for (int n_outputs = 1; n_outputs <= max_outputs; ++n_outputs)
|
|
{
|
|
std::vector<uint64_t> outamounts;
|
|
rct::keyV amount_keys;
|
|
rct::keyV destinations;
|
|
rct::key Sk, Pk;
|
|
uint64_t available = 6000 + 7000;
|
|
uint64_t amount;
|
|
rct::ctkeyM mixRing(sc.size());
|
|
|
|
//add output
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < n_outputs; ++i)
|
|
{
|
|
amount = rct::randXmrAmount(available);
|
|
outamounts.push_back(amount);
|
|
amount_keys.push_back(rct::hash_to_scalar(rct::zero()));
|
|
rct::skpkGen(Sk, Pk);
|
|
destinations.push_back(Pk);
|
|
available -= amount;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < sc.size(); ++i)
|
|
{
|
|
for (size_t j = 0; j <= mixin; ++j)
|
|
{
|
|
if (j == 1)
|
|
mixRing[i].push_back(pc[i]);
|
|
else
|
|
mixRing[i].push_back({rct::scalarmultBase(rct::skGen()), rct::scalarmultBase(rct::skGen())});
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rct::ctkeyV outSk;
|
|
rct::rctSig s = rct::genRctSimple(rct::zero(), sc, destinations, inamounts, outamounts, available, mixRing, amount_keys, NULL, NULL, index, outSk, rct::RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof, hw::get_device("default"));
|
|
ASSERT_TRUE(rct::verRctSimple(s));
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < n_outputs; ++i)
|
|
{
|
|
rct::key mask;
|
|
rct::decodeRctSimple(s, amount_keys[i], i, mask, hw::get_device("default"));
|
|
ASSERT_TRUE(mask == outSk[i].mask);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
TEST(bulletproofs, valid_aggregated)
|
|
{
|
|
static const size_t N_PROOFS = 8;
|
|
std::vector<rct::Bulletproof> proofs(N_PROOFS);
|
|
for (size_t n = 0; n < N_PROOFS; ++n)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t outputs = 2 + n;
|
|
std::vector<uint64_t> amounts;
|
|
rct::keyV gamma;
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < outputs; ++i)
|
|
{
|
|
amounts.push_back(crypto::rand<uint64_t>());
|
|
gamma.push_back(rct::skGen());
|
|
}
|
|
proofs[n] = bulletproof_PROVE(amounts, gamma);
|
|
}
|
|
ASSERT_TRUE(rct::bulletproof_VERIFY(proofs));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
TEST(bulletproofs, invalid_8)
|
|
{
|
|
rct::key invalid_amount = rct::zero();
|
|
invalid_amount[8] = 1;
|
|
rct::Bulletproof proof = bulletproof_PROVE(invalid_amount, rct::skGen());
|
|
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::bulletproof_VERIFY(proof));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
TEST(bulletproofs, invalid_31)
|
|
{
|
|
rct::key invalid_amount = rct::zero();
|
|
invalid_amount[31] = 1;
|
|
rct::Bulletproof proof = bulletproof_PROVE(invalid_amount, rct::skGen());
|
|
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::bulletproof_VERIFY(proof));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
TEST(bulletproofs, invalid_gamma_0)
|
|
{
|
|
rct::key invalid_amount = rct::zero();
|
|
invalid_amount[8] = 1;
|
|
rct::key gamma = rct::zero();
|
|
rct::Bulletproof proof = bulletproof_PROVE(invalid_amount, gamma);
|
|
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::bulletproof_VERIFY(proof));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
TEST(bulletproofs, invalid_gamma_ff)
|
|
{
|
|
rct::key invalid_amount = rct::zero();
|
|
invalid_amount[8] = 1;
|
|
rct::key gamma = rct::zero();
|
|
memset(&gamma, 0xff, sizeof(gamma));
|
|
rct::Bulletproof proof = bulletproof_PROVE(invalid_amount, gamma);
|
|
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::bulletproof_VERIFY(proof));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const char * const torsion_elements[] =
|
|
{
|
|
"c7176a703d4dd84fba3c0b760d10670f2a2053fa2c39ccc64ec7fd7792ac03fa",
|
|
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
|
|
"26e8958fc2b227b045c3f489f2ef98f0d5dfac05d3c63339b13802886d53fc85",
|
|
"ecffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff7f",
|
|
"26e8958fc2b227b045c3f489f2ef98f0d5dfac05d3c63339b13802886d53fc05",
|
|
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000080",
|
|
"c7176a703d4dd84fba3c0b760d10670f2a2053fa2c39ccc64ec7fd7792ac037a",
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
TEST(bulletproofs, invalid_torsion)
|
|
{
|
|
rct::Bulletproof proof = bulletproof_PROVE(7329838943733, rct::skGen());
|
|
ASSERT_TRUE(rct::bulletproof_VERIFY(proof));
|
|
for (const auto &xs: torsion_elements)
|
|
{
|
|
rct::key x;
|
|
ASSERT_TRUE(epee::string_tools::hex_to_pod(xs, x));
|
|
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::isInMainSubgroup(x));
|
|
for (auto &k: proof.V)
|
|
{
|
|
const rct::key org_k = k;
|
|
rct::addKeys(k, org_k, x);
|
|
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::bulletproof_VERIFY(proof));
|
|
k = org_k;
|
|
}
|
|
for (auto &k: proof.L)
|
|
{
|
|
const rct::key org_k = k;
|
|
rct::addKeys(k, org_k, x);
|
|
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::bulletproof_VERIFY(proof));
|
|
k = org_k;
|
|
}
|
|
for (auto &k: proof.R)
|
|
{
|
|
const rct::key org_k = k;
|
|
rct::addKeys(k, org_k, x);
|
|
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::bulletproof_VERIFY(proof));
|
|
k = org_k;
|
|
}
|
|
const rct::key org_A = proof.A;
|
|
rct::addKeys(proof.A, org_A, x);
|
|
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::bulletproof_VERIFY(proof));
|
|
proof.A = org_A;
|
|
const rct::key org_S = proof.S;
|
|
rct::addKeys(proof.S, org_S, x);
|
|
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::bulletproof_VERIFY(proof));
|
|
proof.S = org_S;
|
|
const rct::key org_T1 = proof.T1;
|
|
rct::addKeys(proof.T1, org_T1, x);
|
|
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::bulletproof_VERIFY(proof));
|
|
proof.T1 = org_T1;
|
|
const rct::key org_T2 = proof.T2;
|
|
rct::addKeys(proof.T2, org_T2, x);
|
|
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::bulletproof_VERIFY(proof));
|
|
proof.T2 = org_T2;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|