The problem actually exists in two parts:
1. When sending chunks over a connection, if the queue size is
greater than N, the seed is predictable across every monero node.
>"If rand() is used before any calls to srand(), rand() behaves as if
it was seeded with srand(1). Each time rand() is seeded with the same seed, it
must produce the same sequence of values."
2. The CID speaks for itself: "'rand' should not be used for security-related
applications, because linear congruential algorithms are too easy to break."
*But* this is an area of contention.
One could argue that a CSPRNG is warranted in order to fully mitigate any
potential timing attacks based on crafting chunk responses. Others could argue
that the existing LCG, or even an MTG, would suffice (if properly seeded). As a
compromise, I've used an MTG with a full bit space. This should give a healthy
balance of security and speed without relying on the existing crypto library
(which I'm told might break on some systems since epee is not (shouldn't be)
dependent upon the existing crypto library).
The issue is triggered by the captured `this` in RPC server, which
passes reference to throwable `core_rpc_server`:
`core_rpc_server.cpp:164: m_bootstrap_daemon.reset(new bootstrap_daemon([this]{ return get_random_public_node(); }));`
The solution is to simply remove noexcept from the remaining `bootstrap_daemon`
constructors because noexcept is false in this context.
>"An exception of type "boost::exception_detail::clone_impl<boost::exception_detail::error_info_injector<boost::asio::invalid_service_owner>>" is thrown but the throw list "noexcept" doesn't allow it to be thrown. This will cause a call to unexpected() which usually calls terminate()."
One considers the blockchain, while the other considers the
blockchain and some recent actions, such as a recently created
transaction which spend some outputs, but isn't yet mined.
Typically, the "balance" command wants the latter, to reflect
the recent action, but things like proving ownership wants
the former.
This fixes a crash in get_reserve_proof, where a preliminary
check and the main code used two concepts of "balance".
When no little/big endian flag is given to the writer, it stores
data in host endianness. When loading, if no flag is set, it also
assumes host endianness. This works as long as the loading and
writing are done on machines with the same endianness.
We change this to default to little endian when saving. This will
cause the loader to see the little endian flag, and swap endianness
when loading on a big endian machine. Similarly, writing on a big
endian machine will swap on save, and a little endian machine will
load little endian data.
bdcdb0e Remove unused code under WINDWOS_PLATFORM guard (tomsmeding)
a84aa04 syncobj.h no longer defines shared_guard, so remove those define's (tomsmeding)
bdfc63a Add ref-counted buffer byte_slice. Currently used for sending TCP data. (vtnerd)
3b24b1d Added support for 'noise' over I1P/Tor to mask Tx transmission. (vtnerd)
The 98th percentile position in the agebytes map was incorrectly
calculated: it assumed the transactions in the mempool all have unique
timestamps at second-granularity. This commit fixes this by correctly
finding the right cumulative number of transactions in the map suffix.
This bug could lead to an out-of-bounds write in the rare case that
all transactions in the mempool were received (and added to the mempool)
at a rate of at least 50 transactions per second. (More specifically,
the number of *unique* receive_time values, which have second-
granularity, must be at most 2% of the number of transactions in the
mempool for this crash to trigger.) If this condition is satisfied, 'it'
points to *before* the agebytes map, 'delta' gets a nonsense value, and
the value of 'i' in the first stats.histo-filling loop will be out of
bounds of stats.histo.
