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ANONYMITY_NETWORKS.md : fix unintentional wrapping

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Jonathan Cross 2019-11-23 16:59:42 +01:00
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46
ANONYMITY_NETWORKS.md
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@ -46,8 +46,10 @@ Connecting to an anonymous address requires the command line option
`--tx-proxy` which tells `monerod` the ip/port of a socks proxy provided by a
separate process. On most systems the configuration will look like:
> `--tx-proxy tor,127.0.0.1:9050,10`
> `--tx-proxy i2p,127.0.0.1:9000`
```
--tx-proxy tor,127.0.0.1:9050,10
--tx-proxy i2p,127.0.0.1:9000
```
which tells `monerod` that ".onion" p2p addresses can be forwarded to a socks
proxy at IP 127.0.0.1 port 9050 with a max of 10 outgoing connections and
@ -55,12 +57,14 @@ proxy at IP 127.0.0.1 port 9050 with a max of 10 outgoing connections and
9000 with the default max outgoing connections. Since there are no seed nodes
for anonymity connections, peers must be manually specified:
> `--add-exclusive-node rveahdfho7wo4b2m.onion:28083`
> `--add-peer rveahdfho7wo4b2m.onion:28083`
```
--add-exclusive-node rveahdfho7wo4b2m.onion:28083
--add-peer rveahdfho7wo4b2m.onion:28083
```
Either option can be listed multiple times, and can specify any mix of Tor,
I2P, and IPv4 addresses. Using `--add-exclusive-node` will prevent the usage of
seed nodes on ALL networks, which will typically be undesireable.
seed nodes on ALL networks, which will typically be undesirable.
### Inbound Connections
@ -68,8 +72,10 @@ Receiving anonymity connections is done through the option
`--anonymous-inbound`. This option tells `monerod` the inbound address, network
type, and max connections:
> `--anonymous-inbound rveahdfho7wo4b2m.onion:28083,127.0.0.1:28083,25`
> `--anonymous-inbound cmeua5767mz2q5jsaelk2rxhf67agrwuetaso5dzbenyzwlbkg2q.b32.i2p:5000,127.0.0.1:30000`
```
--anonymous-inbound rveahdfho7wo4b2m.onion:28083,127.0.0.1:28083,25
--anonymous-inbound cmeua5767mz2q5jsaelk2rxhf67agrwuetaso5dzbenyzwlbkg2q.b32.i2p:5000,127.0.0.1:30000
```
which tells `monerod` that a max of 25 inbound Tor connections are being
received at address "rveahdfho7wo4b2m.onion:28083" and forwarded to `monerod`
@ -87,12 +93,16 @@ P2P anonymity connections. The anonymity network (Tor/i2p) is
[configured in the same manner](#configuration), except the localhost port
must be the RPC port (typically 18081 for mainnet) instead of the p2p port:
> HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/data/monero
> HiddenServicePort 18081 127.0.0.1:18081
```
HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/data/monero
HiddenServicePort 18081 127.0.0.1:18081
```
Then the wallet will be configured to use a Tor/i2p address:
> `--proxy 127.0.0.1:9050`
> `--daemon-address rveahdfho7wo4b2m.onion`
```
--proxy 127.0.0.1:9050
--daemon-address rveahdfho7wo4b2m.onion
```
The proxy must match the address type - a Tor proxy will not work properly with
i2p addresses, etc.
@ -125,8 +135,10 @@ can distribute the address to its other peers.
Tor must be configured for hidden services. An example configuration ("torrc")
might look like:
> HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/data/monero
> HiddenServicePort 28083 127.0.0.1:28083
```
HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/data/monero
HiddenServicePort 28083 127.0.0.1:28083
```
This will store key information in `/var/lib/tor/data/monero` and will forward
"Tor port" 28083 to port 28083 of ip 127.0.0.1. The file
@ -170,7 +182,7 @@ be used by an ISP to link a user to a transaction.
Run `monerod` as often as possible to conceal when transactions are being sent.
Future versions will also have peers that first receive a transaction over an
anonymity network delay the broadcast to public peers by a randomized amount.
This will not completetely mitigate a user who syncs up sends then quits, in
This will not completely mitigate a user who syncs up sends then quits, in
part because this rule is not enforceable, so this mitigation strategy is
simply a best effort attempt.
@ -183,9 +195,9 @@ the connections are not circuit based.
#### Mitigation
The best mitigiation is to use I2P instead of Tor. However, I2P
The best mitigation is to use I2P instead of Tor. However, I2P
has a smaller set of users (less cover traffic) and academic reviews, so there
is a tradeoff in potential isses. Also, anyone attempting this strategy really
is a trade off in potential issues. Also, anyone attempting this strategy really
wants to uncover a user, it seems unlikely that this would be performed against
every Tor/I2P user.
@ -213,7 +225,7 @@ key identity.
@secparam (twitter) recommended changing circuits (Tor) as an additional
precaution. This is likely not a good idea - forcibly requesting Tor to change
circuits is observable by the ISP. Instead, `monerod` should likely disconnect
from peers ocassionally. Tor will rotate circuits every ~10 minutes, so
from peers occasionally. Tor will rotate circuits every ~10 minutes, so
establishing new connections will use a new public key identity and make it
more difficult for the hidden service to link information. This process will
have to be done carefully because closing/reconnecting connections can also