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CLSAG optimizations

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This commit is contained in:
Sarang Noether 2020-03-10 18:46:37 -04:00 committed by moneromooo-monero
parent 82ee01699c
commit 641b08c920
4 changed files with 221 additions and 218 deletions
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264
src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp
View file

@ -168,12 +168,17 @@ namespace rct {
// Generate a CLSAG signature
// See paper by Goodell et al. (https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/654)
clsag CLSAG_Gen(const key &message, const keyV & P, const key & p, const keyV & C, const key & z, const unsigned int l, const multisig_kLRki *kLRki, key *mscout, key *mspout) {
//
// The keys are set as follows:
// P[l] == p*G
// C[l] == z*G
// C[i] == C_nonzero[i] - C_offset (for hashing purposes) for all i
clsag CLSAG_Gen(const key &message, const keyV & P, const key & p, const keyV & C, const key & z, const keyV & C_nonzero, const key & C_offset, const unsigned int l, const multisig_kLRki *kLRki, key *mscout, key *mspout) {
clsag sig;
size_t n = P.size(); // ring size
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(n == C.size(), "Signing and commitment key vector sizes must match!");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(n == C_nonzero.size(), "Signing and commitment key vector sizes must match!");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(l < n, "Signing index out of range!");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(scalarmultBase(z) == C[l], "C does not match z!");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES((kLRki && mscout) || (!kLRki && !mscout), "Only one of kLRki/mscout is present");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES((mscout && mspout) || !kLRki, "Multisig pointers are not all present");
@ -212,8 +217,8 @@ namespace rct {
scalarmultKey(aH,H,a);
// Aggregation hashes
keyV mu_P_to_hash(2*n+3); // domain, I, D, P, C
keyV mu_C_to_hash(2*n+3); // domain, I, D, P, C
keyV mu_P_to_hash(2*n+4); // domain, I, D, P, C, C_offset
keyV mu_C_to_hash(2*n+4); // domain, I, D, P, C, C_offset
sc_0(mu_P_to_hash[0].bytes);
memcpy(mu_P_to_hash[0].bytes,config::HASH_KEY_CLSAG_AGG_0,sizeof(config::HASH_KEY_CLSAG_AGG_0)-1);
sc_0(mu_C_to_hash[0].bytes);
@ -223,40 +228,43 @@ namespace rct {
mu_C_to_hash[i] = P[i-1];
}
for (size_t i = n+1; i < 2*n+1; ++i) {
mu_P_to_hash[i] = C[i-n-1];
mu_C_to_hash[i] = C[i-n-1];
mu_P_to_hash[i] = C_nonzero[i-n-1];
mu_C_to_hash[i] = C_nonzero[i-n-1];
}
mu_P_to_hash[2*n+1] = sig.I;
mu_P_to_hash[2*n+2] = sig.D;
mu_P_to_hash[2*n+3] = C_offset;
mu_C_to_hash[2*n+1] = sig.I;
mu_C_to_hash[2*n+2] = sig.D;
mu_C_to_hash[2*n+3] = C_offset;
key mu_P, mu_C;
mu_P = hash_to_scalar(mu_P_to_hash);
mu_C = hash_to_scalar(mu_C_to_hash);
// Initial commitment
keyV c_to_hash(2*n+4); // domain, P, C, message, aG, aH
keyV c_to_hash(2*n+5); // domain, P, C, C_offset, message, aG, aH
key c;
sc_0(c_to_hash[0].bytes);
memcpy(c_to_hash[0].bytes,config::HASH_KEY_CLSAG_ROUND,sizeof(config::HASH_KEY_CLSAG_ROUND)-1);
for (size_t i = 1; i < n+1; ++i)
{
c_to_hash[i] = P[i-1];
c_to_hash[i+n] = C[i-1];
c_to_hash[i+n] = C_nonzero[i-1];
}
c_to_hash[2*n+1] = message;
c_to_hash[2*n+1] = C_offset;
c_to_hash[2*n+2] = message;
// Multisig data is present
if (kLRki)
{
a = kLRki->k;
c_to_hash[2*n+2] = kLRki->L;
c_to_hash[2*n+3] = kLRki->R;
c_to_hash[2*n+3] = kLRki->L;
c_to_hash[2*n+4] = kLRki->R;
}
else
{
c_to_hash[2*n+2] = aG;
c_to_hash[2*n+3] = aH;
c_to_hash[2*n+3] = aG;
c_to_hash[2*n+4] = aH;
}
c = hash_to_scalar(c_to_hash);
@ -295,8 +303,8 @@ namespace rct {
ge_dsm_precomp(H_precomp.k, &Hi_p3);
addKeys_aAbBcC(R,sig.s[i],H_precomp.k,c_p,I_precomp.k,c_c,D_precomp.k);
c_to_hash[2*n+2] = L;
c_to_hash[2*n+3] = R;
c_to_hash[2*n+3] = L;
c_to_hash[2*n+4] = R;
c_new = hash_to_scalar(c_to_hash);
copy(c,c_new);
@ -320,99 +328,8 @@ namespace rct {
return sig;
}
clsag CLSAG_Gen(const key &message, const keyV & P, const key & p, const keyV & C, const key & z, const unsigned int l) {
return CLSAG_Gen(message, P, p, C, z, l, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
// Verify a CLSAG signature
// See paper by Goodell et al. (https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/654)
bool CLSAG_Ver(const key &message, const keyV & P, const keyV & C, const clsag & sig)
{
size_t n = P.size(); // ring size
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(n == C.size(), false, "Signing and commitment key vector sizes must match!");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(n == sig.s.size(), false, "Signature scalar vector is the wrong size!");
for (size_t i = 0; i < n; ++i)
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(sc_check(sig.s[i].bytes) == 0, false, "Bad signature scalar!");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(sc_check(sig.c1.bytes) == 0, false, "Bad signature commitment!");
key c = copy(sig.c1);
key D_8 = scalarmult8(sig.D);
geDsmp I_precomp;
geDsmp D_precomp;
precomp(I_precomp.k,sig.I);
precomp(D_precomp.k,D_8);
// Aggregation hashes
keyV mu_P_to_hash(2*n+3); // domain, I, D, P, C
keyV mu_C_to_hash(2*n+3); // domain, I, D, P, C
sc_0(mu_P_to_hash[0].bytes);
memcpy(mu_P_to_hash[0].bytes,config::HASH_KEY_CLSAG_AGG_0,sizeof(config::HASH_KEY_CLSAG_AGG_0)-1);
sc_0(mu_C_to_hash[0].bytes);
memcpy(mu_C_to_hash[0].bytes,config::HASH_KEY_CLSAG_AGG_1,sizeof(config::HASH_KEY_CLSAG_AGG_1)-1);
for (size_t i = 1; i < n+1; ++i) {
mu_P_to_hash[i] = P[i-1];
mu_C_to_hash[i] = P[i-1];
}
for (size_t i = n+1; i < 2*n+1; ++i) {
mu_P_to_hash[i] = C[i-n-1];
mu_C_to_hash[i] = C[i-n-1];
}
mu_P_to_hash[2*n+1] = sig.I;
mu_P_to_hash[2*n+2] = sig.D;
mu_C_to_hash[2*n+1] = sig.I;
mu_C_to_hash[2*n+2] = sig.D;
key mu_P, mu_C;
mu_P = hash_to_scalar(mu_P_to_hash);
mu_C = hash_to_scalar(mu_C_to_hash);
keyV c_to_hash(2*n+4); // domain, P, C, message, L, R
sc_0(c_to_hash[0].bytes);
memcpy(c_to_hash[0].bytes,config::HASH_KEY_CLSAG_ROUND,sizeof(config::HASH_KEY_CLSAG_ROUND)-1);
for (size_t i = 1; i < n+1; ++i)
{
c_to_hash[i] = P[i-1];
c_to_hash[i+n] = C[i-1];
}
c_to_hash[2*n+1] = message;
key c_p; // = c[i]*mu_P
key c_c; // = c[i]*mu_C
key c_new;
key L;
key R;
geDsmp P_precomp;
geDsmp C_precomp;
geDsmp H_precomp;
size_t i = 0;
ge_p3 hash8_p3;
geDsmp hash_precomp;
while (i < n) {
sc_0(c_new.bytes);
sc_mul(c_p.bytes,mu_P.bytes,c.bytes);
sc_mul(c_c.bytes,mu_C.bytes,c.bytes);
// Precompute points
precomp(P_precomp.k,P[i]);
precomp(C_precomp.k,C[i]);
// Compute L
addKeys_aGbBcC(L,sig.s[i],c_p,P_precomp.k,c_c,C_precomp.k);
// Compute R
hash_to_p3(hash8_p3,P[i]);
ge_dsm_precomp(hash_precomp.k, &hash8_p3);
addKeys_aAbBcC(R,sig.s[i],hash_precomp.k,c_p,I_precomp.k,c_c,D_precomp.k);
c_to_hash[2*n+2] = L;
c_to_hash[2*n+3] = R;
c_new = hash_to_scalar(c_to_hash);
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!(c_new == rct::zero()), false, "Bad signature hash");
copy(c,c_new);
i = i + 1;
}
sc_sub(c_new.bytes,c.bytes,sig.c1.bytes);
return sc_isnonzero(c_new.bytes) == 0;
clsag CLSAG_Gen(const key &message, const keyV & P, const key & p, const keyV & C, const key & z, const keyV & C_nonzero, const key & C_offset, const unsigned int l) {
return CLSAG_Gen(message, P, p, C, z, C_nonzero, C_offset, l, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
// MLSAG signatures
@ -816,12 +733,14 @@ namespace rct {
size_t i;
keyM M(cols, tmp);
keyV P, C;
keyV P, C, C_nonzero;
P.reserve(pubs.size());
C.reserve(pubs.size());
C_nonzero.reserve(pubs.size());
for (const ctkey &k: pubs)
{
P.push_back(k.dest);
C_nonzero.push_back(k.mask);
rct::key tmp;
subKeys(tmp, k.mask, Cout);
C.push_back(tmp);
@ -829,7 +748,7 @@ namespace rct {
sk[0] = copy(inSk.dest);
sc_sub(sk[1].bytes, inSk.mask.bytes, a.bytes);
clsag result = CLSAG_Gen(message, P, sk[0], C, sk[1], index, kLRki, mscout, mspout);
clsag result = CLSAG_Gen(message, P, sk[0], C, sk[1], C_nonzero, Cout, index, kLRki, mscout, mspout);
memwipe(sk.data(), sk.size() * sizeof(key));
return result;
}
@ -913,29 +832,116 @@ namespace rct {
catch (...) { return false; }
}
bool verRctCLSAGSimple(const key &message, const clsag &clsag, const ctkeyV & pubs, const key & C) {
bool verRctCLSAGSimple(const key &message, const clsag &sig, const ctkeyV & pubs, const key & C_offset) {
try
{
PERF_TIMER(verRctCLSAGSimple);
//setup vars
const size_t cols = pubs.size();
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(cols >= 1, false, "Empty pubs");
keyV Pi(cols), Ci(cols);
ge_p3 Cp3;
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES_L1(ge_frombytes_vartime(&Cp3, C.bytes) == 0, false, "point conv failed");
ge_cached Ccached;
ge_p3_to_cached(&Ccached, &Cp3);
ge_p1p1 p1;
//create the matrix to mg sig
for (size_t i = 0; i < cols; i++) {
Pi[i] = pubs[i].dest;
ge_p3 p3;
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES_L1(ge_frombytes_vartime(&p3, pubs[i].mask.bytes) == 0, false, "point conv failed");
ge_sub(&p1, &p3, &Ccached);
ge_p1p1_to_p3(&p3, &p1);
ge_p3_tobytes(Ci[i].bytes, &p3);
const size_t n = pubs.size();
// Check data
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(n >= 1, false, "Empty pubs");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(n == sig.s.size(), false, "Signature scalar vector is the wrong size!");
for (size_t i = 0; i < n; ++i)
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(sc_check(sig.s[i].bytes) == 0, false, "Bad signature scalar!");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(sc_check(sig.c1.bytes) == 0, false, "Bad signature commitment!");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!(sig.I == rct::identity()), false, "Bad key image!");
// Cache commitment offset for efficient subtraction later
ge_p3 C_offset_p3;
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(ge_frombytes_vartime(&C_offset_p3, C_offset.bytes) == 0, false, "point conv failed");
ge_cached C_offset_cached;
ge_p3_to_cached(&C_offset_cached, &C_offset_p3);
// Prepare key images
key c = copy(sig.c1);
key D_8 = scalarmult8(sig.D);
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!(D_8 == rct::identity()), false, "Bad auxiliary key image!");
geDsmp I_precomp;
geDsmp D_precomp;
precomp(I_precomp.k,sig.I);
precomp(D_precomp.k,D_8);
// Aggregation hashes
keyV mu_P_to_hash(2*n+4); // domain, I, D, P, C, C_offset
keyV mu_C_to_hash(2*n+4); // domain, I, D, P, C, C_offset
sc_0(mu_P_to_hash[0].bytes);
memcpy(mu_P_to_hash[0].bytes,config::HASH_KEY_CLSAG_AGG_0,sizeof(config::HASH_KEY_CLSAG_AGG_0)-1);
sc_0(mu_C_to_hash[0].bytes);
memcpy(mu_C_to_hash[0].bytes,config::HASH_KEY_CLSAG_AGG_1,sizeof(config::HASH_KEY_CLSAG_AGG_1)-1);
for (size_t i = 1; i < n+1; ++i) {
mu_P_to_hash[i] = pubs[i-1].dest;
mu_C_to_hash[i] = pubs[i-1].dest;
}
return CLSAG_Ver(message, Pi, Ci, clsag);
for (size_t i = n+1; i < 2*n+1; ++i) {
mu_P_to_hash[i] = pubs[i-n-1].mask;
mu_C_to_hash[i] = pubs[i-n-1].mask;
}
mu_P_to_hash[2*n+1] = sig.I;
mu_P_to_hash[2*n+2] = sig.D;
mu_P_to_hash[2*n+3] = C_offset;
mu_C_to_hash[2*n+1] = sig.I;
mu_C_to_hash[2*n+2] = sig.D;
mu_C_to_hash[2*n+3] = C_offset;
key mu_P, mu_C;
mu_P = hash_to_scalar(mu_P_to_hash);
mu_C = hash_to_scalar(mu_C_to_hash);
// Set up round hash
keyV c_to_hash(2*n+5); // domain, P, C, C_offset, message, L, R
sc_0(c_to_hash[0].bytes);
memcpy(c_to_hash[0].bytes,config::HASH_KEY_CLSAG_ROUND,sizeof(config::HASH_KEY_CLSAG_ROUND)-1);
for (size_t i = 1; i < n+1; ++i)
{
c_to_hash[i] = pubs[i-1].dest;
c_to_hash[i+n] = pubs[i-1].mask;
}
c_to_hash[2*n+1] = C_offset;
c_to_hash[2*n+2] = message;
key c_p; // = c[i]*mu_P
key c_c; // = c[i]*mu_C
key c_new;
key L;
key R;
geDsmp P_precomp;
geDsmp C_precomp;
geDsmp H_precomp;
size_t i = 0;
ge_p3 hash8_p3;
geDsmp hash_precomp;
ge_p3 temp_p3;
ge_p1p1 temp_p1;
while (i < n) {
sc_0(c_new.bytes);
sc_mul(c_p.bytes,mu_P.bytes,c.bytes);
sc_mul(c_c.bytes,mu_C.bytes,c.bytes);
// Precompute points for L/R
precomp(P_precomp.k,pubs[i].dest);
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(ge_frombytes_vartime(&temp_p3, pubs[i].mask.bytes) == 0, false, "point conv failed");
ge_sub(&temp_p1,&temp_p3,&C_offset_cached);
ge_p1p1_to_p3(&temp_p3,&temp_p1);
ge_dsm_precomp(C_precomp.k,&temp_p3);
// Compute L
addKeys_aGbBcC(L,sig.s[i],c_p,P_precomp.k,c_c,C_precomp.k);
// Compute R
hash_to_p3(hash8_p3,pubs[i].dest);
ge_dsm_precomp(hash_precomp.k, &hash8_p3);
addKeys_aAbBcC(R,sig.s[i],hash_precomp.k,c_p,I_precomp.k,c_c,D_precomp.k);
c_to_hash[2*n+3] = L;
c_to_hash[2*n+4] = R;
c_new = hash_to_scalar(c_to_hash);
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!(c_new == rct::zero()), false, "Bad signature hash");
copy(c,c_new);
i = i + 1;
}
sc_sub(c_new.bytes,c.bytes,sig.c1.bytes);
return sc_isnonzero(c_new.bytes) == 0;
}
catch (...) { return false; }
}

7
src/ringct/rctSigs.h
View file

@ -77,9 +77,10 @@ namespace rct {
mgSig MLSAG_Gen(const key &message, const keyM & pk, const keyV & xx, const multisig_kLRki *kLRki, key *mscout, const unsigned int index, size_t dsRows, hw::device &hwdev);
bool MLSAG_Ver(const key &message, const keyM &pk, const mgSig &sig, size_t dsRows);
clsag CLSAG_Gen(const key &message, const keyV & P, const key & p, const keyV & C, const key & z, const unsigned int l, const multisig_kLRki *kLRki, key *mscout, key *mspout);
clsag CLSAG_Gen(const key &message, const keyV & P, const key & p, const keyV & C, const key & z, const unsigned int l);
bool CLSAG_Ver(const key &message, const keyV & P, const keyV & C, const clsag & sig);
clsag CLSAG_Gen(const key &message, const keyV & P, const key & p, const keyV & C, const keyV & C_nonzero, const key & C_offset, const key & z, const unsigned int l, const multisig_kLRki *kLRki, key *mscout, key *mspout);
clsag CLSAG_Gen(const key &message, const keyV & P, const key & p, const keyV & C, const keyV & C_nonzero, const key & C_offset, const key & z, const unsigned int l);
clsag proveRctCLSAGSimple(const key &, const ctkeyV &, const ctkey &, const key &, const key &, const multisig_kLRki *, key *, key *, unsigned int, hw::device &);
bool verRctCLSAGSimple(const key &, const clsag &, const ctkeyV &, const key &);
//proveRange and verRange
//proveRange gives C, and mask such that \sumCi = C

2
tests/performance_tests/main.cpp
View file

@ -61,7 +61,6 @@
#include "crypto_ops.h"
#include "multiexp.h"
#include "sig_mlsag.h"
#include "sig_clsag.h"
namespace po = boost::program_options;
@ -216,7 +215,6 @@ int main(int argc, char** argv)
TEST_PERFORMANCE1(filter, p, test_cn_fast_hash, 16384);
TEST_PERFORMANCE2(filter, p, test_sig_mlsag, 11, true); // MLSAG verification
TEST_PERFORMANCE3(filter, p, test_sig_clsag, 11, true, 0); // CLSAG verification
TEST_PERFORMANCE2(filter, p, test_ringct_mlsag, 11, false);
TEST_PERFORMANCE2(filter, p, test_ringct_mlsag, 11, true);

166
tests/unit_tests/ringct.cpp
View file

@ -140,165 +140,163 @@ TEST(ringct, MG_sigs)
TEST(ringct, CLSAG)
{
const size_t ring_size = 11;
const size_t N = 11;
const size_t idx = 5;
keyV P, C;
key p, z;
ctkeyV pubs;
key p, t, t2, u;
const key message = identity();
key backup;
ctkey backup;
clsag clsag;
for (size_t i = 0; i < ring_size; ++i)
for (size_t i = 0; i < N; ++i)
{
key Sk, Pk;
skpkGen(Sk, Pk);
P.push_back(Pk);
skpkGen(Sk, Pk);
C.push_back(Pk);
}
skpkGen(p, P[idx]);
skpkGen(z, C[idx]);
key sk;
ctkey tmp;
// bad p at creation
clsag = CLSAG_Gen(zero(), P, p, C, z, idx); //, hw::get_device("default"));
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(message, P, C, clsag));
skpkGen(sk, tmp.dest);
skpkGen(sk, tmp.mask);
pubs.push_back(tmp);
}
// Set P[idx]
skpkGen(p, pubs[idx].dest);
// Set C[idx]
t = skGen();
u = skGen();
addKeys2(pubs[idx].mask,t,u,H);
// Set commitment offset
key Cout;
t2 = skGen();
addKeys2(Cout,t2,u,H);
// Prepare generation inputs
ctkey insk;
insk.dest = p;
insk.mask = t;
// bad message
clsag = rct::proveRctCLSAGSimple(zero(),pubs,insk,t2,Cout,NULL,NULL,NULL,idx,hw::get_device("default"));
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
// bad index at creation
try
{
clsag = CLSAG_Gen(message, P, p, C, z, (idx + 1) % ring_size); //, hw::get_device("default"));
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(message, P, C, clsag));
clsag = rct::proveRctCLSAGSimple(message,pubs,insk,t2,Cout,NULL,NULL,NULL,(idx + 1) % N,hw::get_device("default"));
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
}
catch (...) { /* either exception, or failure to verify above */ }
// bad z at creation
try
{
clsag = CLSAG_Gen(message, P, p, C, skGen(), idx); //, hw::get_device("default"));
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(message, P, C, clsag));
ctkey insk2;
insk2.dest = insk.dest;
insk2.mask = skGen();
clsag = rct::proveRctCLSAGSimple(message,pubs,insk2,t2,Cout,NULL,NULL,NULL,idx,hw::get_device("default"));
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
}
catch (...) { /* either exception, or failure to verify above */ }
// bad C at creation
backup = C[idx];
C[idx] = scalarmultBase(skGen());
backup = pubs[idx];
pubs[idx].mask = scalarmultBase(skGen());
try
{
clsag = CLSAG_Gen(message, P, p, C, z, idx); //, hw::get_device("default"));
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(message, P, C, clsag));
clsag = rct::proveRctCLSAGSimple(message,pubs,insk,t2,Cout,NULL,NULL,NULL,idx,hw::get_device("default"));
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
}
catch (...) { /* either exception, or failure to verify above */ }
C[idx] = backup;
pubs[idx] = backup;
// bad p at creation
try
{
clsag = CLSAG_Gen(message, P, skGen(), C, z, idx); //, hw::get_device("default"));
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(message, P, C, clsag));
ctkey insk2;
insk2.dest = skGen();
insk2.mask = insk.mask;
clsag = rct::proveRctCLSAGSimple(message,pubs,insk2,t2,Cout,NULL,NULL,NULL,idx,hw::get_device("default"));
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
}
catch (...) { /* either exception, or failure to verify above */ }
// bad P at creation
backup = P[idx];
P[idx] = scalarmultBase(skGen());
backup = pubs[idx];
pubs[idx].dest = scalarmultBase(skGen());
try
{
clsag = CLSAG_Gen(message, P, p, C, z, idx); //, hw::get_device("default"));
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(message, P, C, clsag));
clsag = rct::proveRctCLSAGSimple(message,pubs,insk,t2,Cout,NULL,NULL,NULL,idx,hw::get_device("default"));
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
}
catch (...) { /* either exception, or failure to verify above */ }
P[idx] = backup;
pubs[idx] = backup;
// good
clsag = CLSAG_Gen(message, P, p, C, z, idx); //, hw::get_device("default"));
ASSERT_TRUE(CLSAG_Ver(message, P, C, clsag));
// bad message at verification
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(zero(), P, C, clsag));
// bad real P at verification
backup = P[idx];
P[idx] = scalarmultBase(skGen());
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(zero(), P, C, clsag));
P[idx] = backup;
// bad fake P at verification
backup = P[(idx + 1) % ring_size];
P[(idx + 1) % ring_size] = scalarmultBase(skGen());
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(zero(), P, C, clsag));
P[(idx + 1) % ring_size] = backup;
// bad real C at verification
backup = C[idx];
C[idx] = scalarmultBase(skGen());
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(zero(), P, C, clsag));
C[idx] = backup;
// bad fake C at verification
backup = C[(idx + 1) % ring_size];
C[(idx + 1) % ring_size] = scalarmultBase(skGen());
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(zero(), P, C, clsag));
C[(idx + 1) % ring_size] = backup;
// Test correct signature
clsag = rct::proveRctCLSAGSimple(message,pubs,insk,t2,Cout,NULL,NULL,NULL,idx,hw::get_device("default"));
ASSERT_TRUE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
// empty s
auto sbackup = clsag.s;
clsag.s.clear();
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(identity(), P, C, clsag));
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
clsag.s = sbackup;
// too few s elements
backup = clsag.s.back();
key backup_key;
backup_key = clsag.s.back();
clsag.s.pop_back();
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(identity(), P, C, clsag));
clsag.s.push_back(backup);
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
clsag.s.push_back(backup_key);
// too many s elements
clsag.s.push_back(skGen());
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(identity(), P, C, clsag));
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
clsag.s.pop_back();
// bad s in clsag at verification
for (auto &s: clsag.s)
{
backup = s;
backup_key = s;
s = skGen();
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(identity(), P, C, clsag));
s = backup;
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
s = backup_key;
}
// bad c1 in clsag at verification
backup = clsag.c1;
backup_key = clsag.c1;
clsag.c1 = skGen();
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(identity(), P, C, clsag));
clsag.c1 = backup;
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
clsag.c1 = backup_key;
// bad I in clsag at verification
backup = clsag.I;
backup_key = clsag.I;
clsag.I = scalarmultBase(skGen());
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(identity(), P, C, clsag));
clsag.I = backup;
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
clsag.I = backup_key;
// bad D in clsag at verification
backup = clsag.D;
backup_key = clsag.D;
clsag.D = scalarmultBase(skGen());
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(identity(), P, C, clsag));
clsag.D = backup;
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
clsag.D = backup_key;
// D not in main subgroup in clsag at verification
backup = clsag.D;
backup_key = clsag.D;
rct::key x;
ASSERT_TRUE(epee::string_tools::hex_to_pod("c7176a703d4dd84fba3c0b760d10670f2a2053fa2c39ccc64ec7fd7792ac03fa", x));
clsag.D = rct::addKeys(clsag.D, x);
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(identity(), P, C, clsag));
clsag.D = backup;
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
clsag.D = backup_key;
// swapped I and D in clsag at verification
std::swap(clsag.I, clsag.D);
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(identity(), P, C, clsag));
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
std::swap(clsag.I, clsag.D);
// check it's still good, in case we failed to restore
ASSERT_TRUE(CLSAG_Ver(message, P, C, clsag));
ASSERT_TRUE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
}
TEST(ringct, range_proofs)