929 lines
38 KiB
C++
929 lines
38 KiB
C++
// Copyright (c) 2016, Monero Research Labs
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//
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// Author: Shen Noether <shen.noether@gmx.com>
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//
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// All rights reserved.
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//
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// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are
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// permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
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//
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// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of
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// conditions and the following disclaimer.
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//
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// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list
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// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
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// materials provided with the distribution.
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//
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// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be
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// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
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// prior written permission.
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//
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// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
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// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
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// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
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// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
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// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF
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// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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#include "misc_log_ex.h"
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#include "common/perf_timer.h"
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#include "common/task_region.h"
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#include "common/thread_group.h"
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#include "common/util.h"
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#include "rctSigs.h"
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#include "cryptonote_basic/cryptonote_format_utils.h"
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using namespace crypto;
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using namespace std;
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#undef MONERO_DEFAULT_LOG_CATEGORY
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#define MONERO_DEFAULT_LOG_CATEGORY "ringct"
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namespace rct {
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//Borromean (c.f. gmax/andytoshi's paper)
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boroSig genBorromean(const key64 x, const key64 P1, const key64 P2, const bits indices) {
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key64 L[2], alpha;
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key c;
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int naught = 0, prime = 0, ii = 0, jj=0;
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boroSig bb;
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for (ii = 0 ; ii < 64 ; ii++) {
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naught = indices[ii]; prime = (indices[ii] + 1) % 2;
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skGen(alpha[ii]);
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scalarmultBase(L[naught][ii], alpha[ii]);
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if (naught == 0) {
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skGen(bb.s1[ii]);
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c = hash_to_scalar(L[naught][ii]);
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addKeys2(L[prime][ii], bb.s1[ii], c, P2[ii]);
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}
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}
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bb.ee = hash_to_scalar(L[1]); //or L[1]..
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key LL, cc;
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for (jj = 0 ; jj < 64 ; jj++) {
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if (!indices[jj]) {
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sc_mulsub(bb.s0[jj].bytes, x[jj].bytes, bb.ee.bytes, alpha[jj].bytes);
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} else {
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skGen(bb.s0[jj]);
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addKeys2(LL, bb.s0[jj], bb.ee, P1[jj]); //different L0
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cc = hash_to_scalar(LL);
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sc_mulsub(bb.s1[jj].bytes, x[jj].bytes, cc.bytes, alpha[jj].bytes);
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}
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}
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return bb;
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}
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//see above.
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bool verifyBorromean(const boroSig &bb, const key64 P1, const key64 P2) {
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key64 Lv1; key chash, LL;
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int ii = 0;
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for (ii = 0 ; ii < 64 ; ii++) {
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addKeys2(LL, bb.s0[ii], bb.ee, P1[ii]);
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chash = hash_to_scalar(LL);
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addKeys2(Lv1[ii], bb.s1[ii], chash, P2[ii]);
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}
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key eeComputed = hash_to_scalar(Lv1); //hash function fine
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return equalKeys(eeComputed, bb.ee);
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}
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//Multilayered Spontaneous Anonymous Group Signatures (MLSAG signatures)
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//These are aka MG signatutes in earlier drafts of the ring ct paper
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// c.f. http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1098 section 2.
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// keyImageV just does I[i] = xx[i] * Hash(xx[i] * G) for each i
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// Gen creates a signature which proves that for some column in the keymatrix "pk"
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// the signer knows a secret key for each row in that column
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// Ver verifies that the MG sig was created correctly
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keyV keyImageV(const keyV &xx) {
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keyV II(xx.size());
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size_t i = 0;
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for (i = 0; i < xx.size(); i++) {
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II[i] = scalarmultKey(hashToPoint(scalarmultBase(xx[i])), xx[i]);
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}
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return II;
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}
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//Multilayered Spontaneous Anonymous Group Signatures (MLSAG signatures)
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//This is a just slghtly more efficient version than the ones described below
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//(will be explained in more detail in Ring Multisig paper
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//These are aka MG signatutes in earlier drafts of the ring ct paper
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// c.f. http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1098 section 2.
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// keyImageV just does I[i] = xx[i] * Hash(xx[i] * G) for each i
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// Gen creates a signature which proves that for some column in the keymatrix "pk"
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// the signer knows a secret key for each row in that column
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// Ver verifies that the MG sig was created correctly
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mgSig MLSAG_Gen(const key &message, const keyM & pk, const keyV & xx, const unsigned int index, size_t dsRows) {
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mgSig rv;
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size_t cols = pk.size();
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(cols >= 2, "Error! What is c if cols = 1!");
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(index < cols, "Index out of range");
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size_t rows = pk[0].size();
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(rows >= 1, "Empty pk");
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for (size_t i = 1; i < cols; ++i) {
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(pk[i].size() == rows, "pk is not rectangular");
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}
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(xx.size() == rows, "Bad xx size");
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(dsRows <= rows, "Bad dsRows size");
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size_t i = 0, j = 0, ii = 0;
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key c, c_old, L, R, Hi;
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sc_0(c_old.bytes);
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vector<geDsmp> Ip(dsRows);
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rv.II = keyV(dsRows);
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keyV alpha(rows);
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keyV aG(rows);
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rv.ss = keyM(cols, aG);
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keyV aHP(dsRows);
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keyV toHash(1 + 3 * dsRows + 2 * (rows - dsRows));
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toHash[0] = message;
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DP("here1");
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for (i = 0; i < dsRows; i++) {
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skpkGen(alpha[i], aG[i]); //need to save alphas for later..
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Hi = hashToPoint(pk[index][i]);
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aHP[i] = scalarmultKey(Hi, alpha[i]);
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toHash[3 * i + 1] = pk[index][i];
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toHash[3 * i + 2] = aG[i];
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toHash[3 * i + 3] = aHP[i];
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rv.II[i] = scalarmultKey(Hi, xx[i]);
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precomp(Ip[i].k, rv.II[i]);
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}
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size_t ndsRows = 3 * dsRows; //non Double Spendable Rows (see identity chains paper)
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for (i = dsRows, ii = 0 ; i < rows ; i++, ii++) {
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skpkGen(alpha[i], aG[i]); //need to save alphas for later..
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toHash[ndsRows + 2 * ii + 1] = pk[index][i];
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toHash[ndsRows + 2 * ii + 2] = aG[i];
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}
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c_old = hash_to_scalar(toHash);
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i = (index + 1) % cols;
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if (i == 0) {
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copy(rv.cc, c_old);
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}
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while (i != index) {
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rv.ss[i] = skvGen(rows);
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sc_0(c.bytes);
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for (j = 0; j < dsRows; j++) {
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addKeys2(L, rv.ss[i][j], c_old, pk[i][j]);
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hashToPoint(Hi, pk[i][j]);
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addKeys3(R, rv.ss[i][j], Hi, c_old, Ip[j].k);
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toHash[3 * j + 1] = pk[i][j];
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toHash[3 * j + 2] = L;
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toHash[3 * j + 3] = R;
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}
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for (j = dsRows, ii = 0; j < rows; j++, ii++) {
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addKeys2(L, rv.ss[i][j], c_old, pk[i][j]);
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toHash[ndsRows + 2 * ii + 1] = pk[i][j];
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toHash[ndsRows + 2 * ii + 2] = L;
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}
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c = hash_to_scalar(toHash);
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copy(c_old, c);
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i = (i + 1) % cols;
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if (i == 0) {
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copy(rv.cc, c_old);
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}
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}
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for (j = 0; j < rows; j++) {
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sc_mulsub(rv.ss[index][j].bytes, c.bytes, xx[j].bytes, alpha[j].bytes);
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}
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return rv;
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}
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//Multilayered Spontaneous Anonymous Group Signatures (MLSAG signatures)
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//This is a just slghtly more efficient version than the ones described below
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//(will be explained in more detail in Ring Multisig paper
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//These are aka MG signatutes in earlier drafts of the ring ct paper
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// c.f. http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1098 section 2.
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// keyImageV just does I[i] = xx[i] * Hash(xx[i] * G) for each i
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// Gen creates a signature which proves that for some column in the keymatrix "pk"
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// the signer knows a secret key for each row in that column
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// Ver verifies that the MG sig was created correctly
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bool MLSAG_Ver(const key &message, const keyM & pk, const mgSig & rv, size_t dsRows) {
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size_t cols = pk.size();
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(cols >= 2, false, "Error! What is c if cols = 1!");
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size_t rows = pk[0].size();
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rows >= 1, false, "Empty pk");
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for (size_t i = 1; i < cols; ++i) {
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(pk[i].size() == rows, false, "pk is not rectangular");
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}
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.II.size() == dsRows, false, "Bad II size");
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.ss.size() == cols, false, "Bad rv.ss size");
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for (size_t i = 0; i < cols; ++i) {
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.ss[i].size() == rows, false, "rv.ss is not rectangular");
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}
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(dsRows <= rows, false, "Bad dsRows value");
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for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.ss.size(); ++i)
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for (size_t j = 0; j < rv.ss[i].size(); ++j)
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(sc_check(rv.ss[i][j].bytes) == 0, false, "Bad ss slot");
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(sc_check(rv.cc.bytes) == 0, false, "Bad cc");
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size_t i = 0, j = 0, ii = 0;
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key c, L, R, Hi;
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key c_old = copy(rv.cc);
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vector<geDsmp> Ip(dsRows);
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for (i = 0 ; i < dsRows ; i++) {
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precomp(Ip[i].k, rv.II[i]);
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}
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size_t ndsRows = 3 * dsRows; //non Double Spendable Rows (see identity chains paper
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keyV toHash(1 + 3 * dsRows + 2 * (rows - dsRows));
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toHash[0] = message;
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i = 0;
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while (i < cols) {
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sc_0(c.bytes);
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for (j = 0; j < dsRows; j++) {
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addKeys2(L, rv.ss[i][j], c_old, pk[i][j]);
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hashToPoint(Hi, pk[i][j]);
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addKeys3(R, rv.ss[i][j], Hi, c_old, Ip[j].k);
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toHash[3 * j + 1] = pk[i][j];
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toHash[3 * j + 2] = L;
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toHash[3 * j + 3] = R;
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}
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for (j = dsRows, ii = 0 ; j < rows ; j++, ii++) {
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addKeys2(L, rv.ss[i][j], c_old, pk[i][j]);
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toHash[ndsRows + 2 * ii + 1] = pk[i][j];
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toHash[ndsRows + 2 * ii + 2] = L;
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}
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c = hash_to_scalar(toHash);
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copy(c_old, c);
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i = (i + 1);
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}
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sc_sub(c.bytes, c_old.bytes, rv.cc.bytes);
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return sc_isnonzero(c.bytes) == 0;
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}
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//proveRange and verRange
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//proveRange gives C, and mask such that \sumCi = C
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// c.f. http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1098 section 5.1
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// and Ci is a commitment to either 0 or 2^i, i=0,...,63
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// thus this proves that "amount" is in [0, 2^64]
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// mask is a such that C = aG + bH, and b = amount
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//verRange verifies that \sum Ci = C and that each Ci is a commitment to 0 or 2^i
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rangeSig proveRange(key & C, key & mask, const xmr_amount & amount) {
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sc_0(mask.bytes);
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identity(C);
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bits b;
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d2b(b, amount);
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rangeSig sig;
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key64 ai;
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key64 CiH;
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int i = 0;
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for (i = 0; i < ATOMS; i++) {
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skGen(ai[i]);
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if (b[i] == 0) {
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scalarmultBase(sig.Ci[i], ai[i]);
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}
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if (b[i] == 1) {
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addKeys1(sig.Ci[i], ai[i], H2[i]);
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}
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subKeys(CiH[i], sig.Ci[i], H2[i]);
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sc_add(mask.bytes, mask.bytes, ai[i].bytes);
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addKeys(C, C, sig.Ci[i]);
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}
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sig.asig = genBorromean(ai, sig.Ci, CiH, b);
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return sig;
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}
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//proveRange and verRange
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//proveRange gives C, and mask such that \sumCi = C
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// c.f. http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1098 section 5.1
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// and Ci is a commitment to either 0 or 2^i, i=0,...,63
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// thus this proves that "amount" is in [0, 2^64]
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// mask is a such that C = aG + bH, and b = amount
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//verRange verifies that \sum Ci = C and that each Ci is a commitment to 0 or 2^i
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bool verRange(const key & C, const rangeSig & as) {
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try
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{
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PERF_TIMER(verRange);
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key64 CiH;
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int i = 0;
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key Ctmp = identity();
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for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
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subKeys(CiH[i], as.Ci[i], H2[i]);
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addKeys(Ctmp, Ctmp, as.Ci[i]);
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}
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if (!equalKeys(C, Ctmp))
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return false;
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if (!verifyBorromean(as.asig, as.Ci, CiH))
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return false;
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return true;
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}
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// we can get deep throws from ge_frombytes_vartime if input isn't valid
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catch (...) { return false; }
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}
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key get_pre_mlsag_hash(const rctSig &rv)
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{
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keyV hashes;
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hashes.reserve(3);
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hashes.push_back(rv.message);
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crypto::hash h;
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std::stringstream ss;
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binary_archive<true> ba(ss);
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const size_t inputs = rv.pseudoOuts.size();
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const size_t outputs = rv.ecdhInfo.size();
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(const_cast<rctSig&>(rv).serialize_rctsig_base(ba, inputs, outputs),
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"Failed to serialize rctSigBase");
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cryptonote::get_blob_hash(ss.str(), h);
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hashes.push_back(hash2rct(h));
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keyV kv;
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kv.reserve((64*3+1) * rv.p.rangeSigs.size());
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for (auto r: rv.p.rangeSigs)
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{
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for (size_t n = 0; n < 64; ++n)
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kv.push_back(r.asig.s0[n]);
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for (size_t n = 0; n < 64; ++n)
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kv.push_back(r.asig.s1[n]);
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kv.push_back(r.asig.ee);
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for (size_t n = 0; n < 64; ++n)
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kv.push_back(r.Ci[n]);
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}
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hashes.push_back(cn_fast_hash(kv));
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return cn_fast_hash(hashes);
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}
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//Ring-ct MG sigs
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//Prove:
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// c.f. http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1098 section 4. definition 10.
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// This does the MG sig on the "dest" part of the given key matrix, and
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// the last row is the sum of input commitments from that column - sum output commitments
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// this shows that sum inputs = sum outputs
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//Ver:
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// verifies the above sig is created corretly
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mgSig proveRctMG(const key &message, const ctkeyM & pubs, const ctkeyV & inSk, const ctkeyV &outSk, const ctkeyV & outPk, unsigned int index, key txnFeeKey) {
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mgSig mg;
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//setup vars
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size_t cols = pubs.size();
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(cols >= 1, "Empty pubs");
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size_t rows = pubs[0].size();
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(rows >= 1, "Empty pubs");
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for (size_t i = 1; i < cols; ++i) {
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(pubs[i].size() == rows, "pubs is not rectangular");
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}
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(inSk.size() == rows, "Bad inSk size");
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(outSk.size() == outPk.size(), "Bad outSk/outPk size");
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keyV sk(rows + 1);
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keyV tmp(rows + 1);
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size_t i = 0, j = 0;
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for (i = 0; i < rows + 1; i++) {
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sc_0(sk[i].bytes);
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identity(tmp[i]);
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}
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keyM M(cols, tmp);
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//create the matrix to mg sig
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for (i = 0; i < cols; i++) {
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M[i][rows] = identity();
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for (j = 0; j < rows; j++) {
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M[i][j] = pubs[i][j].dest;
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addKeys(M[i][rows], M[i][rows], pubs[i][j].mask); //add input commitments in last row
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}
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}
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sc_0(sk[rows].bytes);
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for (j = 0; j < rows; j++) {
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sk[j] = copy(inSk[j].dest);
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sc_add(sk[rows].bytes, sk[rows].bytes, inSk[j].mask.bytes); //add masks in last row
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}
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for (i = 0; i < cols; i++) {
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for (size_t j = 0; j < outPk.size(); j++) {
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subKeys(M[i][rows], M[i][rows], outPk[j].mask); //subtract output Ci's in last row
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}
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//subtract txn fee output in last row
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subKeys(M[i][rows], M[i][rows], txnFeeKey);
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}
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for (size_t j = 0; j < outPk.size(); j++) {
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sc_sub(sk[rows].bytes, sk[rows].bytes, outSk[j].mask.bytes); //subtract output masks in last row..
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}
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return MLSAG_Gen(message, M, sk, index, rows);
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}
|
|
|
|
|
|
//Ring-ct MG sigs Simple
|
|
// Simple version for when we assume only
|
|
// post rct inputs
|
|
// here pubs is a vector of (P, C) length mixin
|
|
// inSk is x, a_in corresponding to signing index
|
|
// a_out, Cout is for the output commitment
|
|
// index is the signing index..
|
|
mgSig proveRctMGSimple(const key &message, const ctkeyV & pubs, const ctkey & inSk, const key &a , const key &Cout, unsigned int index) {
|
|
mgSig mg;
|
|
//setup vars
|
|
size_t rows = 1;
|
|
size_t cols = pubs.size();
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(cols >= 1, "Empty pubs");
|
|
keyV tmp(rows + 1);
|
|
keyV sk(rows + 1);
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
keyM M(cols, tmp);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < cols; i++) {
|
|
M[i][0] = pubs[i].dest;
|
|
subKeys(M[i][1], pubs[i].mask, Cout);
|
|
sk[0] = copy(inSk.dest);
|
|
sc_sub(sk[1].bytes, inSk.mask.bytes, a.bytes);
|
|
}
|
|
return MLSAG_Gen(message, M, sk, index, rows);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
//Ring-ct MG sigs
|
|
//Prove:
|
|
// c.f. http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1098 section 4. definition 10.
|
|
// This does the MG sig on the "dest" part of the given key matrix, and
|
|
// the last row is the sum of input commitments from that column - sum output commitments
|
|
// this shows that sum inputs = sum outputs
|
|
//Ver:
|
|
// verifies the above sig is created corretly
|
|
bool verRctMG(const mgSig &mg, const ctkeyM & pubs, const ctkeyV & outPk, key txnFeeKey, const key &message) {
|
|
PERF_TIMER(verRctMG);
|
|
//setup vars
|
|
size_t cols = pubs.size();
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(cols >= 1, false, "Empty pubs");
|
|
size_t rows = pubs[0].size();
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rows >= 1, false, "Empty pubs");
|
|
for (size_t i = 1; i < cols; ++i) {
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(pubs[i].size() == rows, false, "pubs is not rectangular");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
keyV tmp(rows + 1);
|
|
size_t i = 0, j = 0;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < rows + 1; i++) {
|
|
identity(tmp[i]);
|
|
}
|
|
keyM M(cols, tmp);
|
|
|
|
//create the matrix to mg sig
|
|
for (j = 0; j < rows; j++) {
|
|
for (i = 0; i < cols; i++) {
|
|
M[i][j] = pubs[i][j].dest;
|
|
addKeys(M[i][rows], M[i][rows], pubs[i][j].mask); //add Ci in last row
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
for (i = 0; i < cols; i++) {
|
|
for (j = 0; j < outPk.size(); j++) {
|
|
subKeys(M[i][rows], M[i][rows], outPk[j].mask); //subtract output Ci's in last row
|
|
}
|
|
//subtract txn fee output in last row
|
|
subKeys(M[i][rows], M[i][rows], txnFeeKey);
|
|
}
|
|
return MLSAG_Ver(message, M, mg, rows);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//Ring-ct Simple MG sigs
|
|
//Ver:
|
|
//This does a simplified version, assuming only post Rct
|
|
//inputs
|
|
bool verRctMGSimple(const key &message, const mgSig &mg, const ctkeyV & pubs, const key & C) {
|
|
try
|
|
{
|
|
PERF_TIMER(verRctMGSimple);
|
|
//setup vars
|
|
size_t rows = 1;
|
|
size_t cols = pubs.size();
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(cols >= 1, false, "Empty pubs");
|
|
keyV tmp(rows + 1);
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
keyM M(cols, tmp);
|
|
//create the matrix to mg sig
|
|
for (i = 0; i < cols; i++) {
|
|
M[i][0] = pubs[i].dest;
|
|
subKeys(M[i][1], pubs[i].mask, C);
|
|
}
|
|
//DP(C);
|
|
return MLSAG_Ver(message, M, mg, rows);
|
|
}
|
|
catch (...) { return false; }
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
//These functions get keys from blockchain
|
|
//replace these when connecting blockchain
|
|
//getKeyFromBlockchain grabs a key from the blockchain at "reference_index" to mix with
|
|
//populateFromBlockchain creates a keymatrix with "mixin" columns and one of the columns is inPk
|
|
// the return value are the key matrix, and the index where inPk was put (random).
|
|
void getKeyFromBlockchain(ctkey & a, size_t reference_index) {
|
|
a.mask = pkGen();
|
|
a.dest = pkGen();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//These functions get keys from blockchain
|
|
//replace these when connecting blockchain
|
|
//getKeyFromBlockchain grabs a key from the blockchain at "reference_index" to mix with
|
|
//populateFromBlockchain creates a keymatrix with "mixin" + 1 columns and one of the columns is inPk
|
|
// the return value are the key matrix, and the index where inPk was put (random).
|
|
tuple<ctkeyM, xmr_amount> populateFromBlockchain(ctkeyV inPk, int mixin) {
|
|
int rows = inPk.size();
|
|
ctkeyM rv(mixin + 1, inPk);
|
|
int index = randXmrAmount(mixin);
|
|
int i = 0, j = 0;
|
|
for (i = 0; i <= mixin; i++) {
|
|
if (i != index) {
|
|
for (j = 0; j < rows; j++) {
|
|
getKeyFromBlockchain(rv[i][j], (size_t)randXmrAmount);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return make_tuple(rv, index);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//These functions get keys from blockchain
|
|
//replace these when connecting blockchain
|
|
//getKeyFromBlockchain grabs a key from the blockchain at "reference_index" to mix with
|
|
//populateFromBlockchain creates a keymatrix with "mixin" columns and one of the columns is inPk
|
|
// the return value are the key matrix, and the index where inPk was put (random).
|
|
xmr_amount populateFromBlockchainSimple(ctkeyV & mixRing, const ctkey & inPk, int mixin) {
|
|
int index = randXmrAmount(mixin);
|
|
int i = 0;
|
|
for (i = 0; i <= mixin; i++) {
|
|
if (i != index) {
|
|
getKeyFromBlockchain(mixRing[i], (size_t)randXmrAmount(1000));
|
|
} else {
|
|
mixRing[i] = inPk;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return index;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//RingCT protocol
|
|
//genRct:
|
|
// creates an rctSig with all data necessary to verify the rangeProofs and that the signer owns one of the
|
|
// columns that are claimed as inputs, and that the sum of inputs = sum of outputs.
|
|
// Also contains masked "amount" and "mask" so the receiver can see how much they received
|
|
//verRct:
|
|
// verifies that all signatures (rangeProogs, MG sig, sum inputs = outputs) are correct
|
|
//decodeRct: (c.f. http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1098 section 5.1.1)
|
|
// uses the attached ecdh info to find the amounts represented by each output commitment
|
|
// must know the destination private key to find the correct amount, else will return a random number
|
|
// Note: For txn fees, the last index in the amounts vector should contain that
|
|
// Thus the amounts vector will be "one" longer than the destinations vectort
|
|
rctSig genRct(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const vector<xmr_amount> & amounts, const ctkeyM &mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, unsigned int index, ctkeyV &outSk) {
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(amounts.size() == destinations.size() || amounts.size() == destinations.size() + 1, "Different number of amounts/destinations");
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(amount_keys.size() == destinations.size(), "Different number of amount_keys/destinations");
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(index < mixRing.size(), "Bad index into mixRing");
|
|
for (size_t n = 0; n < mixRing.size(); ++n) {
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(mixRing[n].size() == inSk.size(), "Bad mixRing size");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rctSig rv;
|
|
rv.type = RCTTypeFull;
|
|
rv.message = message;
|
|
rv.outPk.resize(destinations.size());
|
|
rv.p.rangeSigs.resize(destinations.size());
|
|
rv.ecdhInfo.resize(destinations.size());
|
|
|
|
size_t i = 0;
|
|
keyV masks(destinations.size()); //sk mask..
|
|
outSk.resize(destinations.size());
|
|
for (i = 0; i < destinations.size(); i++) {
|
|
//add destination to sig
|
|
rv.outPk[i].dest = copy(destinations[i]);
|
|
//compute range proof
|
|
rv.p.rangeSigs[i] = proveRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, outSk[i].mask, amounts[i]);
|
|
#ifdef DBG
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]), "verRange failed on newly created proof");
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
//mask amount and mask
|
|
rv.ecdhInfo[i].mask = copy(outSk[i].mask);
|
|
rv.ecdhInfo[i].amount = d2h(amounts[i]);
|
|
ecdhEncode(rv.ecdhInfo[i], amount_keys[i]);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//set txn fee
|
|
if (amounts.size() > destinations.size())
|
|
{
|
|
rv.txnFee = amounts[destinations.size()];
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
rv.txnFee = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
key txnFeeKey = scalarmultH(d2h(rv.txnFee));
|
|
|
|
rv.mixRing = mixRing;
|
|
rv.p.MGs.push_back(proveRctMG(get_pre_mlsag_hash(rv), rv.mixRing, inSk, outSk, rv.outPk, index, txnFeeKey));
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rctSig genRct(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const ctkeyV & inPk, const keyV & destinations, const vector<xmr_amount> & amounts, const keyV &amount_keys, const int mixin) {
|
|
unsigned int index;
|
|
ctkeyM mixRing;
|
|
ctkeyV outSk;
|
|
tie(mixRing, index) = populateFromBlockchain(inPk, mixin);
|
|
return genRct(message, inSk, destinations, amounts, mixRing, amount_keys, index, outSk);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//RCT simple
|
|
//for post-rct only
|
|
rctSig genRctSimple(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const vector<xmr_amount> &inamounts, const vector<xmr_amount> &outamounts, xmr_amount txnFee, const ctkeyM & mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, const std::vector<unsigned int> & index, ctkeyV &outSk) {
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(inamounts.size() > 0, "Empty inamounts");
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(inamounts.size() == inSk.size(), "Different number of inamounts/inSk");
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(outamounts.size() == destinations.size(), "Different number of amounts/destinations");
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(amount_keys.size() == destinations.size(), "Different number of amount_keys/destinations");
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(index.size() == inSk.size(), "Different number of index/inSk");
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(mixRing.size() == inSk.size(), "Different number of mixRing/inSk");
|
|
for (size_t n = 0; n < mixRing.size(); ++n) {
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(index[n] < mixRing[n].size(), "Bad index into mixRing");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rctSig rv;
|
|
rv.type = RCTTypeSimple;
|
|
rv.message = message;
|
|
rv.outPk.resize(destinations.size());
|
|
rv.p.rangeSigs.resize(destinations.size());
|
|
rv.ecdhInfo.resize(destinations.size());
|
|
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
keyV masks(destinations.size()); //sk mask..
|
|
outSk.resize(destinations.size());
|
|
key sumout = zero();
|
|
for (i = 0; i < destinations.size(); i++) {
|
|
|
|
//add destination to sig
|
|
rv.outPk[i].dest = copy(destinations[i]);
|
|
//compute range proof
|
|
rv.p.rangeSigs[i] = proveRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, outSk[i].mask, outamounts[i]);
|
|
#ifdef DBG
|
|
verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
sc_add(sumout.bytes, outSk[i].mask.bytes, sumout.bytes);
|
|
|
|
//mask amount and mask
|
|
rv.ecdhInfo[i].mask = copy(outSk[i].mask);
|
|
rv.ecdhInfo[i].amount = d2h(outamounts[i]);
|
|
ecdhEncode(rv.ecdhInfo[i], amount_keys[i]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//set txn fee
|
|
rv.txnFee = txnFee;
|
|
// TODO: unused ??
|
|
// key txnFeeKey = scalarmultH(d2h(rv.txnFee));
|
|
rv.mixRing = mixRing;
|
|
rv.pseudoOuts.resize(inamounts.size());
|
|
rv.p.MGs.resize(inamounts.size());
|
|
key sumpouts = zero(); //sum pseudoOut masks
|
|
keyV a(inamounts.size());
|
|
for (i = 0 ; i < inamounts.size() - 1; i++) {
|
|
skGen(a[i]);
|
|
sc_add(sumpouts.bytes, a[i].bytes, sumpouts.bytes);
|
|
genC(rv.pseudoOuts[i], a[i], inamounts[i]);
|
|
}
|
|
rv.mixRing = mixRing;
|
|
sc_sub(a[i].bytes, sumout.bytes, sumpouts.bytes);
|
|
genC(rv.pseudoOuts[i], a[i], inamounts[i]);
|
|
DP(rv.pseudoOuts[i]);
|
|
|
|
key full_message = get_pre_mlsag_hash(rv);
|
|
for (i = 0 ; i < inamounts.size(); i++) {
|
|
rv.p.MGs[i] = proveRctMGSimple(full_message, rv.mixRing[i], inSk[i], a[i], rv.pseudoOuts[i], index[i]);
|
|
}
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rctSig genRctSimple(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const ctkeyV & inPk, const keyV & destinations, const vector<xmr_amount> &inamounts, const vector<xmr_amount> &outamounts, const keyV &amount_keys, xmr_amount txnFee, unsigned int mixin) {
|
|
std::vector<unsigned int> index;
|
|
index.resize(inPk.size());
|
|
ctkeyM mixRing;
|
|
ctkeyV outSk;
|
|
mixRing.resize(inPk.size());
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < inPk.size(); ++i) {
|
|
mixRing[i].resize(mixin+1);
|
|
index[i] = populateFromBlockchainSimple(mixRing[i], inPk[i], mixin);
|
|
}
|
|
return genRctSimple(message, inSk, destinations, inamounts, outamounts, txnFee, mixRing, amount_keys, index, outSk);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//RingCT protocol
|
|
//genRct:
|
|
// creates an rctSig with all data necessary to verify the rangeProofs and that the signer owns one of the
|
|
// columns that are claimed as inputs, and that the sum of inputs = sum of outputs.
|
|
// Also contains masked "amount" and "mask" so the receiver can see how much they received
|
|
//verRct:
|
|
// verifies that all signatures (rangeProogs, MG sig, sum inputs = outputs) are correct
|
|
//decodeRct: (c.f. http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1098 section 5.1.1)
|
|
// uses the attached ecdh info to find the amounts represented by each output commitment
|
|
// must know the destination private key to find the correct amount, else will return a random number
|
|
bool verRct(const rctSig & rv, bool semantics) {
|
|
PERF_TIMER(verRct);
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull, false, "verRct called on non-full rctSig");
|
|
if (semantics)
|
|
{
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.p.rangeSigs.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and rv.p.rangeSigs");
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.ecdhInfo.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and rv.ecdhInfo");
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.MGs.size() == 1, false, "full rctSig has not one MG");
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
// semantics check is early, we don't have the MGs resolved yet
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// some rct ops can throw
|
|
try
|
|
{
|
|
if (semantics) {
|
|
std::deque<bool> results(rv.outPk.size(), false);
|
|
tools::thread_group threadpool(tools::thread_group::optimal_with_max(rv.outPk.size()));
|
|
|
|
tools::task_region(threadpool, [&] (tools::task_region_handle& region) {
|
|
DP("range proofs verified?");
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.outPk.size(); i++) {
|
|
region.run([&, i] {
|
|
results[i] = verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]);
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.outPk.size(); ++i) {
|
|
if (!results[i]) {
|
|
LOG_PRINT_L1("Range proof verified failed for output " << i);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!semantics) {
|
|
//compute txn fee
|
|
key txnFeeKey = scalarmultH(d2h(rv.txnFee));
|
|
bool mgVerd = verRctMG(rv.p.MGs[0], rv.mixRing, rv.outPk, txnFeeKey, get_pre_mlsag_hash(rv));
|
|
DP("mg sig verified?");
|
|
DP(mgVerd);
|
|
if (!mgVerd) {
|
|
LOG_PRINT_L1("MG signature verification failed");
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
catch(...)
|
|
{
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//ver RingCT simple
|
|
//assumes only post-rct style inputs (at least for max anonymity)
|
|
bool verRctSimple(const rctSig & rv, bool semantics) {
|
|
try
|
|
{
|
|
PERF_TIMER(verRctSimple);
|
|
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple, false, "verRctSimple called on non simple rctSig");
|
|
if (semantics)
|
|
{
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.p.rangeSigs.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and rv.p.rangeSigs");
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.ecdhInfo.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and rv.ecdhInfo");
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.pseudoOuts.size() == rv.p.MGs.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of rv.pseudoOuts and rv.p.MGs");
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
// semantics check is early, and mixRing/MGs aren't resolved yet
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.pseudoOuts.size() == rv.mixRing.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of rv.pseudoOuts and mixRing");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const size_t threads = std::max(rv.outPk.size(), rv.mixRing.size());
|
|
|
|
std::deque<bool> results(threads);
|
|
tools::thread_group threadpool(tools::thread_group::optimal_with_max(threads));
|
|
|
|
if (semantics) {
|
|
key sumOutpks = identity();
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.outPk.size(); i++) {
|
|
addKeys(sumOutpks, sumOutpks, rv.outPk[i].mask);
|
|
}
|
|
DP(sumOutpks);
|
|
key txnFeeKey = scalarmultH(d2h(rv.txnFee));
|
|
addKeys(sumOutpks, txnFeeKey, sumOutpks);
|
|
|
|
key sumPseudoOuts = identity();
|
|
for (size_t i = 0 ; i < rv.pseudoOuts.size() ; i++) {
|
|
addKeys(sumPseudoOuts, sumPseudoOuts, rv.pseudoOuts[i]);
|
|
}
|
|
DP(sumPseudoOuts);
|
|
|
|
//check pseudoOuts vs Outs..
|
|
if (!equalKeys(sumPseudoOuts, sumOutpks)) {
|
|
LOG_PRINT_L1("Sum check failed");
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
results.clear();
|
|
results.resize(rv.outPk.size());
|
|
tools::task_region(threadpool, [&] (tools::task_region_handle& region) {
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.outPk.size(); i++) {
|
|
region.run([&, i] {
|
|
results[i] = verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]);
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < results.size(); ++i) {
|
|
if (!results[i]) {
|
|
LOG_PRINT_L1("Range proof verified failed for output " << i);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
const key message = get_pre_mlsag_hash(rv);
|
|
|
|
results.clear();
|
|
results.resize(rv.mixRing.size());
|
|
tools::task_region(threadpool, [&] (tools::task_region_handle& region) {
|
|
for (size_t i = 0 ; i < rv.mixRing.size() ; i++) {
|
|
region.run([&, i] {
|
|
results[i] = verRctMGSimple(message, rv.p.MGs[i], rv.mixRing[i], rv.pseudoOuts[i]);
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < results.size(); ++i) {
|
|
if (!results[i]) {
|
|
LOG_PRINT_L1("verRctMGSimple failed for input " << i);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
// we can get deep throws from ge_frombytes_vartime if input isn't valid
|
|
catch (...) { return false; }
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//RingCT protocol
|
|
//genRct:
|
|
// creates an rctSig with all data necessary to verify the rangeProofs and that the signer owns one of the
|
|
// columns that are claimed as inputs, and that the sum of inputs = sum of outputs.
|
|
// Also contains masked "amount" and "mask" so the receiver can see how much they received
|
|
//verRct:
|
|
// verifies that all signatures (rangeProogs, MG sig, sum inputs = outputs) are correct
|
|
//decodeRct: (c.f. http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1098 section 5.1.1)
|
|
// uses the attached ecdh info to find the amounts represented by each output commitment
|
|
// must know the destination private key to find the correct amount, else will return a random number
|
|
xmr_amount decodeRct(const rctSig & rv, const key & sk, unsigned int i, key & mask) {
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull, false, "decodeRct called on non-full rctSig");
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Mismatched sizes of rv.outPk and rv.ecdhInfo");
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(i < rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Bad index");
|
|
|
|
//mask amount and mask
|
|
ecdhTuple ecdh_info = rv.ecdhInfo[i];
|
|
ecdhDecode(ecdh_info, sk);
|
|
mask = ecdh_info.mask;
|
|
key amount = ecdh_info.amount;
|
|
key C = rv.outPk[i].mask;
|
|
DP("C");
|
|
DP(C);
|
|
key Ctmp;
|
|
addKeys2(Ctmp, mask, amount, H);
|
|
DP("Ctmp");
|
|
DP(Ctmp);
|
|
if (equalKeys(C, Ctmp) == false) {
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(false, "warning, amount decoded incorrectly, will be unable to spend");
|
|
}
|
|
return h2d(amount);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
xmr_amount decodeRct(const rctSig & rv, const key & sk, unsigned int i) {
|
|
key mask;
|
|
return decodeRct(rv, sk, i, mask);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
xmr_amount decodeRctSimple(const rctSig & rv, const key & sk, unsigned int i, key &mask) {
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple, false, "decodeRct called on non simple rctSig");
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Mismatched sizes of rv.outPk and rv.ecdhInfo");
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(i < rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Bad index");
|
|
|
|
//mask amount and mask
|
|
ecdhTuple ecdh_info = rv.ecdhInfo[i];
|
|
ecdhDecode(ecdh_info, sk);
|
|
mask = ecdh_info.mask;
|
|
key amount = ecdh_info.amount;
|
|
key C = rv.outPk[i].mask;
|
|
DP("C");
|
|
DP(C);
|
|
key Ctmp;
|
|
addKeys2(Ctmp, mask, amount, H);
|
|
DP("Ctmp");
|
|
DP(Ctmp);
|
|
if (equalKeys(C, Ctmp) == false) {
|
|
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(false, "warning, amount decoded incorrectly, will be unable to spend");
|
|
}
|
|
return h2d(amount);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
xmr_amount decodeRctSimple(const rctSig & rv, const key & sk, unsigned int i) {
|
|
key mask;
|
|
return decodeRctSimple(rv, sk, i, mask);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|