bbda81ce30
Fixes: - CERT case ID: VU#228519 - CVE-2017-13077 - CVE-2017-13078 - CVE-2017-13079 - CVE-2017-13080 - CVE-2017-13081 - CVE-2017-13082 - CVE-2017-13086 - CVE-2017-13087 - CVE-2017-13088 For more information see: https://w1.fi/security/2017-1/wpa-packet-number-reuse-with-replayed-messages.txt Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
154 lines
5.2 KiB
Diff
154 lines
5.2 KiB
Diff
From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
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Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 15:15:35 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake
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Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame
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processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids
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issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing
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same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and
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also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed
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frames on RX side.
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This issue was introduced by the commit
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0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in
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authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple
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times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is
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needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt
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failed.
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Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
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---
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--- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
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+++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
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@@ -2522,6 +2522,7 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hos
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{
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struct ieee80211_ht_capabilities ht_cap;
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struct ieee80211_vht_capabilities vht_cap;
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+ int set = 1;
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/*
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* Remove the STA entry to ensure the STA PS state gets cleared and
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@@ -2529,9 +2530,18 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hos
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* FT-over-the-DS, where a station re-associates back to the same AP but
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* skips the authentication flow, or if working with a driver that
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* does not support full AP client state.
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+ *
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+ * Skip this if the STA has already completed FT reassociation and the
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+ * TK has been configured since the TX/RX PN must not be reset to 0 for
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+ * the same key.
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*/
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- if (!sta->added_unassoc)
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+ if (!sta->added_unassoc &&
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+ (!(sta->flags & WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED) ||
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+ !wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(sta->wpa_sm))) {
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hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr);
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+ wpa_auth_sm_event(sta->wpa_sm, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED);
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+ set = 0;
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+ }
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#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211N
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if (sta->flags & WLAN_STA_HT)
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@@ -2554,11 +2564,11 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hos
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sta->flags & WLAN_STA_VHT ? &vht_cap : NULL,
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sta->flags | WLAN_STA_ASSOC, sta->qosinfo,
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sta->vht_opmode, sta->p2p_ie ? 1 : 0,
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- sta->added_unassoc)) {
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+ set)) {
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hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr,
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HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, HOSTAPD_LEVEL_NOTICE,
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"Could not %s STA to kernel driver",
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- sta->added_unassoc ? "set" : "add");
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+ set ? "set" : "add");
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if (sta->added_unassoc) {
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hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr);
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--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
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+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
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@@ -1783,6 +1783,9 @@ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_m
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#else /* CONFIG_FILS */
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break;
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#endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
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+ case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED:
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+ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
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+ return 0;
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
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@@ -3922,6 +3925,14 @@ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_
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}
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+int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
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+{
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+ if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
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+ return 0;
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+ return sm->tk_already_set;
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+}
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+
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+
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int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
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struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry)
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{
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--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
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+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
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@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticato
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u8 *data, size_t data_len);
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enum wpa_event {
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WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH,
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- WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_ASSOC_FILS
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+ WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_ASSOC_FILS, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED
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};
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void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
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int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event);
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@@ -313,6 +313,7 @@ int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_sta
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int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
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int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
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int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
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+int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
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int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
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struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry);
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struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
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--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
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+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
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@@ -1937,6 +1937,14 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state
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return;
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}
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+ if (sm->tk_already_set) {
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+ /* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX
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+ * PN in the driver */
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+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
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+ "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
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+ return;
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+ }
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+
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/* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail
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* most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only
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* after association has been completed. This function will be called
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@@ -1949,6 +1957,7 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state
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/* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
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sm->pairwise_set = TRUE;
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+ sm->tk_already_set = TRUE;
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}
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@@ -2152,6 +2161,7 @@ static int wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struc
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sm->pairwise = pairwise;
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sm->PTK_valid = TRUE;
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+ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
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wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm);
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buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
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--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
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+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
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@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine {
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struct wpa_ptk PTK;
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Boolean PTK_valid;
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Boolean pairwise_set;
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+ Boolean tk_already_set;
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int keycount;
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Boolean Pair;
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struct wpa_key_replay_counter {
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