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hostapd: backport extra changes related to KRACK

Browse source 
While these changes are not included in the advisory, upstream
encourages users to merge them.
See http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/hostap/2017-October/037989.html

Signed-off-by: Stijn Tintel <stijn@linux-ipv6.be>
This commit is contained in:
Stijn Tintel 2017-10-17 16:24:14 +03:00
parent 3db529d5cc
commit 2127425434
9 changed files with 442 additions and 9 deletions
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34
package/network/services/hostapd/patches/008-WPA-Extra-defense-against-PTK-reinstalls-in-4-way-ha.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
From a00e946c1c9a1f9cc65c72900d2a444ceb1f872e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
Date: Thu, 5 Oct 2017 23:53:01 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] WPA: Extra defense against PTK reinstalls in 4-way handshake
Currently, reinstallations of the PTK are prevented by (1) assuring the
same TPTK is only set once as the PTK, and (2) that one particular PTK
is only installed once. This patch makes it more explicit that point (1)
is required to prevent key reinstallations. At the same time, this patch
hardens wpa_supplicant such that future changes do not accidentally
break this property.
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
---
src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
@@ -1728,6 +1728,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_verify_eapol_k
sm->ptk_set = 1;
os_memcpy(&sm->ptk, &sm->tptk, sizeof(sm->ptk));
os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
+ /*
+ * This assures the same TPTK in sm->tptk can never be
+ * copied twice to sm->pkt as the new PTK. In
+ * combination with the installed flag in the wpa_ptk
+ * struct, this assures the same PTK is only installed
+ * once.
+ */
+ sm->renew_snonce = 1;
}
}

53
package/network/services/hostapd/patches/009-Clear-PMK-length-and-check-for-this-when-deriving-PT.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
From b488a12948751f57871f09baa345e59b23959a41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Sun, 8 Oct 2017 13:18:02 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] Clear PMK length and check for this when deriving PTK
Instead of setting the default PMK length for the cleared PMK, set the
length to 0 and explicitly check for this when deriving PTK to avoid
unexpected key derivation with an all-zeroes key should it be possible
to somehow trigger PTK derivation to happen before PMK derivation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
src/common/wpa_common.c | 5 +++++
src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 7 ++++---
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/src/common/wpa_common.c
+++ b/src/common/wpa_common.c
@@ -225,6 +225,11 @@ int wpa_pmk_to_ptk(const u8 *pmk, size_t
u8 tmp[WPA_KCK_MAX_LEN + WPA_KEK_MAX_LEN + WPA_TK_MAX_LEN];
size_t ptk_len;
+ if (pmk_len == 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "WPA: No PMK set for PT derivation");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
if (os_memcmp(addr1, addr2, ETH_ALEN) < 0) {
os_memcpy(data, addr1, ETH_ALEN);
os_memcpy(data + ETH_ALEN, addr2, ETH_ALEN);
--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
@@ -584,7 +584,8 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_
/* Calculate PTK which will be stored as a temporary PTK until it has
* been verified when processing message 3/4. */
ptk = &sm->tptk;
- wpa_derive_ptk(sm, src_addr, key, ptk);
+ if (wpa_derive_ptk(sm, src_addr, key, ptk) < 0)
+ goto failed;
if (sm->pairwise_cipher == WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) {
u8 buf[8];
/* Supplicant: swap tx/rx Mic keys */
@@ -2705,8 +2706,8 @@ void wpa_sm_set_pmk_from_pmksa(struct wp
sm->pmk_len = sm->cur_pmksa->pmk_len;
os_memcpy(sm->pmk, sm->cur_pmksa->pmk, sm->pmk_len);
} else {
- sm->pmk_len = PMK_LEN;
- os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, PMK_LEN);
+ sm->pmk_len = 0;
+ os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, PMK_LEN_MAX);
}
}

221
package/network/services/hostapd/patches/010-Optional-AP-side-workaround-for-key-reinstallation-a.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
From 6f234c1e2ee1ede29f2412b7012b3345ed8e52d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Mon, 16 Oct 2017 18:37:43 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] Optional AP side workaround for key reinstallation attacks
This adds a new hostapd configuration parameter
wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries=1 that can be used to disable
retransmission of EAPOL-Key frames that are used to install
keys (EAPOL-Key message 3/4 and group message 1/2). This is
similar to setting wpa_group_update_count=1 and
wpa_pairwise_update_count=1, but with no impact to message 1/4
retries and with extended timeout for messages 4/4 and group
message 2/2 to avoid causing issues with stations that may use
aggressive power saving have very long time in replying to the
EAPOL-Key messages.
This option can be used to work around key reinstallation attacks
on the station (supplicant) side in cases those station devices
cannot be updated for some reason. By removing the
retransmissions the attacker cannot cause key reinstallation with
a delayed frame transmission. This is related to the station side
vulnerabilities CVE-2017-13077, CVE-2017-13078, CVE-2017-13079,
CVE-2017-13080, and CVE-2017-13081.
This workaround might cause interoperability issues and reduced
robustness of key negotiation especially in environments with
heavy traffic load due to the number of attempts to perform the
key exchange is reduced significantly. As such, this workaround
is disabled by default (unless overridden in build
configuration). To enable this, set the parameter to 1.
It is also possible to enable this in the build by default by
adding the following to the build configuration:
CFLAGS += -DDEFAULT_WPA_DISABLE_EAPOL_KEY_RETRIES=1
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
hostapd/config_file.c | 2 ++
hostapd/defconfig | 4 ++++
hostapd/hostapd.conf | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/ap/ap_config.c | 6 ++++++
src/ap/ap_config.h | 1 +
src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++--
src/ap/wpa_auth.h | 1 +
src/ap/wpa_auth_glue.c | 2 ++
8 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/hostapd/config_file.c
+++ b/hostapd/config_file.c
@@ -2542,6 +2542,8 @@ static int hostapd_config_fill(struct ho
return 1;
}
bss->wpa_pairwise_update_count = (u32) val;
+ } else if (os_strcmp(buf, "wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries") == 0) {
+ bss->wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries = atoi(pos);
} else if (os_strcmp(buf, "wpa_passphrase") == 0) {
int len = os_strlen(pos);
if (len < 8 || len > 63) {
--- a/hostapd/defconfig
+++ b/hostapd/defconfig
@@ -372,3 +372,7 @@ CONFIG_IPV6=y
# Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE)
# Experimental implementation of draft-harkins-owe-07.txt
#CONFIG_OWE=y
+
+# Override default value for the wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries configuration
+# parameter. See that parameter in hostapd.conf for more details.
+#CFLAGS += -DDEFAULT_WPA_DISABLE_EAPOL_KEY_RETRIES=1
--- a/hostapd/hostapd.conf
+++ b/hostapd/hostapd.conf
@@ -1315,6 +1315,30 @@ own_ip_addr=127.0.0.1
# Range 1..4294967295; default: 4
#wpa_pairwise_update_count=4
+# Workaround for key reinstallation attacks
+#
+# This parameter can be used to disable retransmission of EAPOL-Key frames that
+# are used to install keys (EAPOL-Key message 3/4 and group message 1/2). This
+# is similar to setting wpa_group_update_count=1 and
+# wpa_pairwise_update_count=1, but with no impact to message 1/4 and with
+# extended timeout on the response to avoid causing issues with stations that
+# may use aggressive power saving have very long time in replying to the
+# EAPOL-Key messages.
+#
+# This option can be used to work around key reinstallation attacks on the
+# station (supplicant) side in cases those station devices cannot be updated
+# for some reason. By removing the retransmissions the attacker cannot cause
+# key reinstallation with a delayed frame transmission. This is related to the
+# station side vulnerabilities CVE-2017-13077, CVE-2017-13078, CVE-2017-13079,
+# CVE-2017-13080, and CVE-2017-13081.
+#
+# This workaround might cause interoperability issues and reduced robustness of
+# key negotiation especially in environments with heavy traffic load due to the
+# number of attempts to perform the key exchange is reduced significantly. As
+# such, this workaround is disabled by default (unless overridden in build
+# configuration). To enable this, set the parameter to 1.
+#wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries=1
+
# Enable IEEE 802.11i/RSN/WPA2 pre-authentication. This is used to speed up
# roaming be pre-authenticating IEEE 802.1X/EAP part of the full RSN
# authentication and key handshake before actually associating with a new AP.
--- a/src/ap/ap_config.c
+++ b/src/ap/ap_config.c
@@ -37,6 +37,10 @@ static void hostapd_config_free_vlan(str
}
+#ifndef DEFAULT_WPA_DISABLE_EAPOL_KEY_RETRIES
+#define DEFAULT_WPA_DISABLE_EAPOL_KEY_RETRIES 0
+#endif /* DEFAULT_WPA_DISABLE_EAPOL_KEY_RETRIES */
+
void hostapd_config_defaults_bss(struct hostapd_bss_config *bss)
{
dl_list_init(&bss->anqp_elem);
@@ -58,6 +62,8 @@ void hostapd_config_defaults_bss(struct
bss->wpa_gmk_rekey = 86400;
bss->wpa_group_update_count = 4;
bss->wpa_pairwise_update_count = 4;
+ bss->wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries =
+ DEFAULT_WPA_DISABLE_EAPOL_KEY_RETRIES;
bss->wpa_key_mgmt = WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK;
bss->wpa_pairwise = WPA_CIPHER_TKIP;
bss->wpa_group = WPA_CIPHER_TKIP;
--- a/src/ap/ap_config.h
+++ b/src/ap/ap_config.h
@@ -333,6 +333,7 @@ struct hostapd_bss_config {
int wpa_ptk_rekey;
u32 wpa_group_update_count;
u32 wpa_pairwise_update_count;
+ int wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries;
int rsn_pairwise;
int rsn_preauth;
char *rsn_preauth_interfaces;
--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ static u8 * ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wp
static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first = 100; /* ms */
static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_subseq = 1000; /* ms */
static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first_group = 500; /* ms */
+static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_no_retrans = 4000; /* ms */
/* TODO: make these configurable */
static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime = 43200;
@@ -1653,6 +1654,9 @@ static void wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_au
eapol_key_timeout_first_group;
else
timeout_ms = eapol_key_timeout_subseq;
+ if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries &&
+ (!pairwise || (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)))
+ timeout_ms = eapol_key_timeout_no_retrans;
if (pairwise && ctr == 1 && !(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC))
sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 1;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Use EAPOL-Key timeout of %u ms (retry "
@@ -2882,6 +2886,11 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING)
sm->TimeoutEvt = FALSE;
sm->TimeoutCtr++;
+ if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries &&
+ sm->TimeoutCtr > 1) {
+ /* Do not allow retransmission of EAPOL-Key msg 3/4 */
+ return;
+ }
if (sm->TimeoutCtr > sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count) {
/* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
* immediately following this. */
@@ -3220,7 +3229,9 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK)
sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise && sm->MICVerified)
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKINITDONE);
else if (sm->TimeoutCtr >
- sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count) {
+ sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count ||
+ (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries &&
+ sm->TimeoutCtr > 1)) {
wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++;
wpa_auth_vlogger(
sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
@@ -3260,6 +3271,11 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING
SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING, wpa_ptk_group);
sm->GTimeoutCtr++;
+ if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries &&
+ sm->GTimeoutCtr > 1) {
+ /* Do not allow retransmission of EAPOL-Key group msg 1/2 */
+ return;
+ }
if (sm->GTimeoutCtr > sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_update_count) {
/* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
* immediately following this. */
@@ -3363,7 +3379,9 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK_GROUP)
!sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise && sm->MICVerified)
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYESTABLISHED);
else if (sm->GTimeoutCtr >
- sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_update_count)
+ sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_update_count ||
+ (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries &&
+ sm->GTimeoutCtr > 1))
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, KEYERROR);
else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING);
--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
@@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ struct wpa_auth_config {
int wpa_ptk_rekey;
u32 wpa_group_update_count;
u32 wpa_pairwise_update_count;
+ int wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries;
int rsn_pairwise;
int rsn_preauth;
int eapol_version;
--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_glue.c
+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_glue.c
@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ static void hostapd_wpa_auth_conf(struct
wconf->wpa_gmk_rekey = conf->wpa_gmk_rekey;
wconf->wpa_ptk_rekey = conf->wpa_ptk_rekey;
wconf->wpa_group_update_count = conf->wpa_group_update_count;
+ wconf->wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries =
+ conf->wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries;
wconf->wpa_pairwise_update_count = conf->wpa_pairwise_update_count;
wconf->rsn_pairwise = conf->rsn_pairwise;
wconf->rsn_preauth = conf->rsn_preauth;

100
package/network/services/hostapd/patches/011-Additional-consistentcy-checks-for-PTK-component-len.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
From a6ea665300919d6a3af22b1f4237203647fda93a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2017 00:01:11 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] Additional consistentcy checks for PTK component lengths
Verify that TK, KCK, and KEK lengths are set to consistent values within
struct wpa_ptk before using them in supplicant. This is an additional
layer of protection against unexpected states.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
src/common/wpa_common.c | 6 ++++++
src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------
2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/src/common/wpa_common.c
+++ b/src/common/wpa_common.c
@@ -100,6 +100,12 @@ int wpa_eapol_key_mic(const u8 *key, siz
{
u8 hash[SHA512_MAC_LEN];
+ if (key_len == 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "WPA: KCK not set - cannot calculate MIC");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
switch (ver) {
#ifndef CONFIG_FIPS
case WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4:
--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
@@ -725,6 +725,11 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(st
alg = wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->pairwise_cipher);
keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->pairwise_cipher);
+ if (keylen <= 0 || (unsigned int) keylen != sm->ptk.tk_len) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: TK length mismatch: %d != %lu",
+ keylen, (long unsigned int) sm->ptk.tk_len);
+ return -1;
+ }
rsclen = wpa_cipher_rsc_len(sm->pairwise_cipher);
if (sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN || sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_OSEN) {
@@ -745,6 +750,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(st
/* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */
os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN);
+ sm->ptk.tk_len = 0;
sm->ptk.installed = 1;
if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) {
@@ -1717,9 +1723,10 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_verify_eapol_k
os_memcpy(mic, key + 1, mic_len);
if (sm->tptk_set) {
os_memset(key + 1, 0, mic_len);
- wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->tptk.kck, sm->tptk.kck_len, sm->key_mgmt,
- ver, buf, len, (u8 *) (key + 1));
- if (os_memcmp_const(mic, key + 1, mic_len) != 0) {
+ if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->tptk.kck, sm->tptk.kck_len,
+ sm->key_mgmt,
+ ver, buf, len, (u8 *) (key + 1)) < 0 ||
+ os_memcmp_const(mic, key + 1, mic_len) != 0) {
wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
"WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key MIC "
"when using TPTK - ignoring TPTK");
@@ -1742,9 +1749,10 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_verify_eapol_k
if (!ok && sm->ptk_set) {
os_memset(key + 1, 0, mic_len);
- wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->ptk.kck, sm->ptk.kck_len, sm->key_mgmt,
- ver, buf, len, (u8 *) (key + 1));
- if (os_memcmp_const(mic, key + 1, mic_len) != 0) {
+ if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->ptk.kck, sm->ptk.kck_len,
+ sm->key_mgmt,
+ ver, buf, len, (u8 *) (key + 1)) < 0 ||
+ os_memcmp_const(mic, key + 1, mic_len) != 0) {
wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
"WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key MIC - "
"dropping packet");
@@ -4167,6 +4175,11 @@ int fils_process_assoc_resp(struct wpa_s
alg = wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->pairwise_cipher);
keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->pairwise_cipher);
+ if (keylen <= 0 || (unsigned int) keylen != sm->ptk.tk_len) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: TK length mismatch: %u != %lu",
+ keylen, (long unsigned int) sm->ptk.tk_len);
+ goto fail;
+ }
rsclen = wpa_cipher_rsc_len(sm->pairwise_cipher);
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Set TK to driver",
sm->ptk.tk, keylen);
@@ -4183,6 +4196,7 @@ int fils_process_assoc_resp(struct wpa_s
* takes care of association frame encryption/decryption. */
/* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */
os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN);
+ sm->ptk.tk_len = 0;
sm->ptk.installed = 1;
/* FILS HLP Container */

25
package/network/services/hostapd/patches/012-Clear-BSSID-information-in-supplicant-state-machine-.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
From c0fe5f125a9d4a6564e1f4956ccc3809bf2fd69d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2017 01:15:24 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] Clear BSSID information in supplicant state machine on
disconnection
This fixes a corner case where RSN pre-authentication candidate from
scan results was ignored if the station was associated with that BSS
just before running the new scan for the connection.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
@@ -2662,6 +2662,7 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_disassoc(struct wpa_s
wpa_sm_drop_sa(sm);
sm->msg_3_of_4_ok = 0;
+ os_memset(sm->bssid, 0, ETH_ALEN);
}

4
package/network/services/hostapd/patches/300-noscan.patch
View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
--- a/hostapd/config_file.c
+++ b/hostapd/config_file.c
@@ -3014,6 +3014,10 @@ static int hostapd_config_fill(struct ho
@@ -3016,6 +3016,10 @@ static int hostapd_config_fill(struct ho
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211N
@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
} else if (os_strcmp(buf, "ht_capab") == 0) {
--- a/src/ap/ap_config.h
+++ b/src/ap/ap_config.h
@@ -734,6 +734,8 @@ struct hostapd_config {
@@ -735,6 +735,8 @@ struct hostapd_config {
int ht_op_mode_fixed;
u16 ht_capab;

8
package/network/services/hostapd/patches/380-disable_ctrl_iface_mib.patch
View file

@ -129,7 +129,7 @@
static void ieee802_1x_wnm_notif_send(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
@@ -3762,6 +3762,7 @@ static const char * wpa_bool_txt(int val
@@ -3780,6 +3780,7 @@ static const char * wpa_bool_txt(int val
return val ? "TRUE" : "FALSE";
}
@ -137,7 +137,7 @@
#define RSN_SUITE "%02x-%02x-%02x-%d"
#define RSN_SUITE_ARG(s) \
@@ -3906,7 +3907,7 @@ int wpa_get_mib_sta(struct wpa_state_mac
@@ -3924,7 +3925,7 @@ int wpa_get_mib_sta(struct wpa_state_mac
return len;
}
@ -148,7 +148,7 @@
{
--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
@@ -2339,6 +2339,8 @@ static u32 wpa_key_mgmt_suite(struct wpa
@@ -2356,6 +2356,8 @@ static u32 wpa_key_mgmt_suite(struct wpa
}
@ -157,7 +157,7 @@
#define RSN_SUITE "%02x-%02x-%02x-%d"
#define RSN_SUITE_ARG(s) \
((s) >> 24) & 0xff, ((s) >> 16) & 0xff, ((s) >> 8) & 0xff, (s) & 0xff
@@ -2422,6 +2424,7 @@ int wpa_sm_get_mib(struct wpa_sm *sm, ch
@@ -2439,6 +2441,7 @@ int wpa_sm_get_mib(struct wpa_sm *sm, ch
return (int) len;
}

4
package/network/services/hostapd/patches/390-wpa_ie_cap_workaround.patch
View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
--- a/src/common/wpa_common.c
+++ b/src/common/wpa_common.c
@@ -1664,6 +1664,31 @@ u32 wpa_akm_to_suite(int akm)
@@ -1675,6 +1675,31 @@ u32 wpa_akm_to_suite(int akm)
}
@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
int wpa_compare_rsn_ie(int ft_initial_assoc,
const u8 *ie1, size_t ie1len,
const u8 *ie2, size_t ie2len)
@@ -1671,8 +1696,19 @@ int wpa_compare_rsn_ie(int ft_initial_as
@@ -1682,8 +1707,19 @@ int wpa_compare_rsn_ie(int ft_initial_as
if (ie1 == NULL || ie2 == NULL)
return -1;

2
package/network/services/hostapd/patches/600-ubus_support.patch
View file

@ -298,7 +298,7 @@
}
--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_glue.c
+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_glue.c
@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ static void hostapd_wpa_auth_psk_failure
@@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ static void hostapd_wpa_auth_psk_failure
struct hostapd_data *hapd = ctx;
wpa_msg(hapd->msg_ctx, MSG_INFO, AP_STA_POSSIBLE_PSK_MISMATCH MACSTR,
MAC2STR(addr));