38 lines
1.6 KiB
Diff
38 lines
1.6 KiB
Diff
|
From 9ed4eee345f85e3025c33c6e20aa25696e341ccd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||
|
|
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
|
||
|
|
Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2015 11:32:11 +0300
|
||
|
|
Subject: [PATCH] P2P: Validate SSID element length before copying it
|
||
|
|
(CVE-2015-1863)
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
This fixes a possible memcpy overflow for P2P dev->oper_ssid in
|
||
|
|
p2p_add_device(). The length provided by the peer device (0..255 bytes)
|
||
|
|
was used without proper bounds checking and that could have resulted in
|
||
|
|
arbitrary data of up to 223 bytes being written beyond the end of the
|
||
|
|
dev->oper_ssid[] array (of which about 150 bytes would be beyond the
|
||
|
|
heap allocation) when processing a corrupted management frame for P2P
|
||
|
|
peer discovery purposes.
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
This could result in corrupted state in heap, unexpected program
|
||
|
|
behavior due to corrupted P2P peer device information, denial of service
|
||
|
|
due to process crash, exposure of memory contents during GO Negotiation,
|
||
|
|
and potentially arbitrary code execution.
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
Thanks to Google security team for reporting this issue and smart
|
||
|
|
hardware research group of Alibaba security team for discovering it.
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
|
||
|
|
---
|
||
|
|
src/p2p/p2p.c | 1 +
|
||
|
|
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
--- a/src/p2p/p2p.c
|
||
|
|
+++ b/src/p2p/p2p.c
|
||
|
|
@@ -778,6 +778,7 @@ int p2p_add_device(struct p2p_data *p2p,
|
||
|
|
if (os_memcmp(addr, p2p_dev_addr, ETH_ALEN) != 0)
|
||
|
|
os_memcpy(dev->interface_addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
|
||
|
|
if (msg.ssid &&
|
||
|
|
+ msg.ssid[1] <= sizeof(dev->oper_ssid) &&
|
||
|
|
(msg.ssid[1] != P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN ||
|
||
|
|
os_memcmp(msg.ssid + 2, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN)
|
||
|
|
!= 0)) {
|