6c40914c0c
- WPS: Fix HTTP chunked transfer encoding parser (CVE-2015-4141) - EAP-pwd peer: Fix payload length validation for Commit and Confirm (CVE-2015-4143) - EAP-pwd server: Fix payload length validation for Commit and Confirm (CVE-2015-4143) - EAP-pwd peer: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment reassembly (CVE-2015-4144, CVE-2015-4145) - EAP-pwd server: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment reassembly (CVE-2015-4144, CVE-2015-4145) - EAP-pwd peer: Fix asymmetric fragmentation behavior (CVE-2015-4146) - NFC: Fix payload length validation in NDEF record parser (CVE-2015-8041) - WNM: Ignore Key Data in WNM Sleep Mode Response frame if no PMF in use (CVE-2015-5310) - EAP-pwd peer: Fix last fragment length validation (CVE-2015-5315) - EAP-pwd server: Fix last fragment length validation (CVE-2015-5314) - EAP-pwd peer: Fix error path for unexpected Confirm message (CVE-2015-5316) Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de> SVN-Revision: 48185
54 lines
2 KiB
Diff
54 lines
2 KiB
Diff
From 8057821706784608b828e769ccefbced95591e50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:18:17 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix last fragment length validation
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All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining
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room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last
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fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer.
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The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual
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buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process
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termination. (CVE-2015-5315)
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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---
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src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 7 +++----
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1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
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index 1f78544..75ceef1 100644
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--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
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+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
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@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
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/*
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* buffer and ACK the fragment
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*/
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- if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
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+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) {
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data->in_frag_pos += len;
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if (data->in_frag_pos > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow attack "
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@@ -916,7 +916,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
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return NULL;
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}
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wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
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-
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+ }
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+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
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resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD,
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EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE,
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EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, eap_get_id(reqData));
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@@ -930,10 +931,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
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* we're buffering and this is the last fragment
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*/
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if (data->in_frag_pos) {
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- wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes",
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(int) len);
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- data->in_frag_pos += len;
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pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf);
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len = data->in_frag_pos;
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}
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--
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1.9.1
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