openwrtv3/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/100-remove-cryptoapi-dependencies.patch
Felix Fietkau b30e092de6 mac80211: update to version 2015-06-22
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org>

SVN-Revision: 46198
2015-07-06 16:26:34 +00:00

374 lines
11 KiB
Diff

--- a/net/mac80211/Makefile
+++ b/net/mac80211/Makefile
@@ -15,9 +15,7 @@ mac80211-y := \
michael.o \
tkip.o \
aes_ccm.o \
- aes_gcm.o \
aes_cmac.o \
- aes_gmac.o \
cfg.o \
ethtool.o \
rx.o \
--- a/net/mac80211/aes_gcm.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/aes_gcm.h
@@ -11,12 +11,28 @@
#include <linux/crypto.h>
-void ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad,
- u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic);
-int ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad,
- u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic);
-struct crypto_aead *ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[],
- size_t key_len);
-void ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_free(struct crypto_aead *tfm);
+static inline void
+ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad,
+ u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic)
+{
+}
+
+static inline int
+ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad,
+ u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static inline struct crypto_aead *
+ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[], size_t key_len)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static inline void
+ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_free(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
+{
+}
#endif /* AES_GCM_H */
--- a/net/mac80211/aes_gmac.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/aes_gmac.h
@@ -11,10 +11,22 @@
#include <linux/crypto.h>
-struct crypto_aead *ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_setup(const u8 key[],
- size_t key_len);
-int ieee80211_aes_gmac(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *aad, u8 *nonce,
- const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic);
-void ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_free(struct crypto_aead *tfm);
+static inline struct crypto_aead *
+ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_setup(const u8 key[], size_t key_len)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static inline int
+ieee80211_aes_gmac(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *aad, u8 *nonce,
+ const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static inline void
+ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_free(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
+{
+}
#endif /* AES_GMAC_H */
--- a/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.c
@@ -19,86 +19,126 @@
#include "key.h"
#include "aes_ccm.h"
-void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
+static void aes_ccm_prepare(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad, u8 *s_0,
+ u8 *a, u8 *b)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, b, b_0);
+
+ /* Extra Authenticate-only data (always two AES blocks) */
+ for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; i++)
+ aad[i] ^= b[i];
+ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, b, aad);
+
+ aad += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; i++)
+ aad[i] ^= b[i];
+ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, a, aad);
+
+ /* Mask out bits from auth-only-b_0 */
+ b_0[0] &= 0x07;
+
+ /* S_0 is used to encrypt T (= MIC) */
+ b_0[14] = 0;
+ b_0[15] = 0;
+ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, s_0, b_0);
+}
+
+
+void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic,
size_t mic_len)
{
- struct scatterlist assoc, pt, ct[2];
+ int i, j, last_len, num_blocks;
+ u8 b[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 s_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 e[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 *pos, *cpos;
+
+ num_blocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(data_len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ last_len = data_len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ aes_ccm_prepare(tfm, b_0, aad, s_0, b, b);
+
+ /* Process payload blocks */
+ pos = data;
+ cpos = data;
+ for (j = 1; j <= num_blocks; j++) {
+ int blen = (j == num_blocks && last_len) ?
+ last_len : AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+ /* Authentication followed by encryption */
+ for (i = 0; i < blen; i++)
+ b[i] ^= pos[i];
+ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, b, b);
+
+ b_0[14] = (j >> 8) & 0xff;
+ b_0[15] = j & 0xff;
+ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, e, b_0);
+ for (i = 0; i < blen; i++)
+ *cpos++ = *pos++ ^ e[i];
+ }
- char aead_req_data[sizeof(struct aead_request) +
- crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm)]
- __aligned(__alignof__(struct aead_request));
- struct aead_request *aead_req = (void *) aead_req_data;
-
- memset(aead_req, 0, sizeof(aead_req_data));
-
- sg_init_one(&pt, data, data_len);
- sg_init_one(&assoc, &aad[2], be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)aad));
- sg_init_table(ct, 2);
- sg_set_buf(&ct[0], data, data_len);
- sg_set_buf(&ct[1], mic, mic_len);
-
- aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, tfm);
- aead_request_set_assoc(aead_req, &assoc, assoc.length);
- aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, &pt, ct, data_len, b_0);
-
- crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req);
+ for (i = 0; i < mic_len; i++)
+ mic[i] = b[i] ^ s_0[i];
}
-int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
+int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic,
size_t mic_len)
{
- struct scatterlist assoc, pt, ct[2];
- char aead_req_data[sizeof(struct aead_request) +
- crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm)]
- __aligned(__alignof__(struct aead_request));
- struct aead_request *aead_req = (void *) aead_req_data;
-
- if (data_len == 0)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- memset(aead_req, 0, sizeof(aead_req_data));
-
- sg_init_one(&pt, data, data_len);
- sg_init_one(&assoc, &aad[2], be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)aad));
- sg_init_table(ct, 2);
- sg_set_buf(&ct[0], data, data_len);
- sg_set_buf(&ct[1], mic, mic_len);
-
- aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, tfm);
- aead_request_set_assoc(aead_req, &assoc, assoc.length);
- aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, ct, &pt, data_len + mic_len, b_0);
+ int i, j, last_len, num_blocks;
+ u8 *pos, *cpos;
+ u8 a[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 b[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 s_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+ num_blocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(data_len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ last_len = data_len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ aes_ccm_prepare(tfm, b_0, aad, s_0, a, b);
+
+ /* Process payload blocks */
+ cpos = data;
+ pos = data;
+ for (j = 1; j <= num_blocks; j++) {
+ int blen = (j == num_blocks && last_len) ?
+ last_len : AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+ /* Decryption followed by authentication */
+ b_0[14] = (j >> 8) & 0xff;
+ b_0[15] = j & 0xff;
+ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, b, b_0);
+ for (i = 0; i < blen; i++) {
+ *pos = *cpos++ ^ b[i];
+ a[i] ^= *pos++;
+ }
+ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, a, a);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < mic_len; i++) {
+ if ((mic[i] ^ s_0[i]) != a[i])
+ return -1;
+ }
- return crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req);
+ return 0;
}
-struct crypto_aead *ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[],
- size_t key_len,
- size_t mic_len)
+struct crypto_cipher *ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[],
+ size_t key_len,
+ size_t mic_len)
{
- struct crypto_aead *tfm;
- int err;
+ struct crypto_cipher *tfm;
- tfm = crypto_alloc_aead("ccm(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
- if (IS_ERR(tfm))
- return tfm;
-
- err = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm, key, key_len);
- if (err)
- goto free_aead;
- err = crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm, mic_len);
- if (err)
- goto free_aead;
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (!IS_ERR(tfm))
+ crypto_cipher_setkey(tfm, key, key_len);
return tfm;
-
-free_aead:
- crypto_free_aead(tfm);
- return ERR_PTR(err);
}
-void ieee80211_aes_key_free(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
+
+void ieee80211_aes_key_free(struct crypto_cipher *tfm)
{
- crypto_free_aead(tfm);
+ crypto_free_cipher(tfm);
}
--- a/net/mac80211/key.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/key.h
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ struct ieee80211_key {
* Management frames.
*/
u8 rx_pn[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS + 1][IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN];
- struct crypto_aead *tfm;
+ struct crypto_cipher *tfm;
u32 replays; /* dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */
} ccmp;
struct {
--- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
@@ -304,7 +304,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct iee
}
-static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad)
+static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
+ u16 data_len)
{
__le16 mask_fc;
int a4_included, mgmt;
@@ -334,14 +335,8 @@ static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct s
else
qos_tid = 0;
- /* In CCM, the initial vectors (IV) used for CTR mode encryption and CBC
- * mode authentication are not allowed to collide, yet both are derived
- * from this vector b_0. We only set L := 1 here to indicate that the
- * data size can be represented in (L+1) bytes. The CCM layer will take
- * care of storing the data length in the top (L+1) bytes and setting
- * and clearing the other bits as is required to derive the two IVs.
- */
- b_0[0] = 0x1;
+ /* First block, b_0 */
+ b_0[0] = 0x59; /* flags: Adata: 1, M: 011, L: 001 */
/* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN
* Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7)
@@ -349,6 +344,8 @@ static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct s
b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4);
memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
+ /* l(m) */
+ put_unaligned_be16(data_len, &b_0[14]);
/* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
* FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */
@@ -460,7 +457,7 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8
return 0;
pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN;
- ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
+ ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad, len);
ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, pos, len,
skb_put(skb, mic_len), mic_len);
@@ -531,7 +528,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct iee
u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
- ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
+ ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad, data_len);
if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(
key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad,
--- a/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.h
@@ -12,15 +12,15 @@
#include <linux/crypto.h>
-struct crypto_aead *ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[],
- size_t key_len,
- size_t mic_len);
-void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
+struct crypto_cipher *ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[],
+ size_t key_len,
+ size_t mic_len);
+void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic,
size_t mic_len);
-int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
+int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic,
size_t mic_len);
-void ieee80211_aes_key_free(struct crypto_aead *tfm);
+void ieee80211_aes_key_free(struct crypto_cipher *tfm);
#endif /* AES_CCM_H */
--- a/net/mac80211/Kconfig
+++ b/net/mac80211/Kconfig
@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@ config MAC80211
depends on CRYPTO
depends on CRYPTO_ARC4
depends on CRYPTO_AES
- select BPAUTO_CRYPTO_CCM
- depends on CRYPTO_GCM
depends on CRC32
select BPAUTO_AVERAGE
---help---